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COMMENT

GROUP BOYCOTTS BY HEALTH CARE
PROFESSIONALS: IS THE PER SE RULE AN
APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the United States Supreme Court decided a decade ago in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar1 that the so-called "learned professions"
were not exempt but were subject to the constraints imposed by the
Sherman Act,2 controversy has not subsided over the scope of federal
antitrust liability for professionals acting in concert. Providing fuel for
this controversy are continued Supreme Court indications that the
learned professions may be treated differently in the antitrust equation
than are other traditional business and commercial entities. 3
The demise of the "implied" exemption for the learned professions
has resulted in a significant number of recent antitrust actions against
health care practitioners and their professional associations under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Typical among the claims are those of excluded health care professionals who contend that the conduct of their
peers in denying them admitting privileges on hospital medical staffs,
or membership status in professional associations, constitutes actionable anticompetitive conduct. In response, defendant health care professionals are advancing "innovative" arguments to justify their exclusionary conduct based upon Supreme Court indications that the
learned professions may receive different antitrust treatment. Common
among the defendants' justifications are that professional self-regulation and other ethical "watchdog" activities should receive merited consideration in the antitrust equation.
Notwithstanding the appeal of the justifications offered by defendant health care professionals, experience gained from traditional anti-

1. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See infra text accompanying notes 30-39.
2. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
3. For an analysis of the Supreme Court decisions indicating that the learned professions
may receive different antitrust treatment, see infra text accompanying notes 30-64.
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trust analysis of the conduct of business entities and trade associations
demonstrates that such self-regulatory activity is not free from anticompetitive abuses. In fact, it is clear that even health care professionals engaging in exclusionary conduct have competitive interests at
-stake beyond merely ensuring the competency of their fellow
practitioners. 4
This factual scenario gives rise to the fundamental issue to be addressed by this comment: When, if ever, should learned professionals
acting in concert receive different antitrust treatment than that accorded other business and commercial entities under section 1 of Sherman Act? Should justifications that health care professionals are
merely acting in the general public's interest in enforcing ethical norms
designed to ensure the competency of their members be enough to remove a practice from per se antitrust illegality to one analyzed under
the rule-of-reason? 5 In order to satisfactorily resolve this important
contemporary issue, this comment will focus on the group boycott activity of hospital medical staffs and health care professional associations in denying fellow practitioners and potential competitors desired
privileges and status. Importantly, plaintiffs challenging such exclusionary conduct under section 1 of the Sherman Act are having success.
The lower federal courts have not, however, reached unanimity regarding the appropriate standards for antitrust analysis.6
In analyzing the controversial group boycott activity of health care
professionals, it will first be useful to gain an understanding of exactly

4. For a discussion of the tactics employed by the American Medical Association in preserving its so-called "'monopoly" in medical care against the other school of medical thought, osteopathy, see Blackstone, The A.M.A. and the Osteopaths: A Study of the Power of Organized
Medicine, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 405 (1977).
5. When analyzing restraints of trade challenged under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the courts
utilize two standards of antitrust review: The rule-of-reason and the per se approaches. "[Tihe
rule of reason requires the factfinder to decide whether under all the circumstances of the case the
restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition." Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982). "The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (Brandeis, J.). In making this determination under the rule-of-reason,
"the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable." Id.
Certain types of pernicious restraints are automatically condemned under the per se rule
when "experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence
that the rule of reason will condemn it ...." Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 344. Accordingly, "[o]nce
established, per se rules tend to provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the
burdens on litigants and the judicial system of the more complex rule-of-reason trials .... "
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1976). For further discussion
on the per se and the rule-of-reason methods of antitrust analysis, see infra note 42.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 129-97.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
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what is at stake for the excluded health care practitioner. This comment will then review and analyze relevant Supreme Court precedents
that are pertinent to the learned professions, group boycotts, and other
issues arising under section 1 of the Sherman Act when the exclusionary and concerted conduct of health care professionals is challenged.
Analysis will then focus on three recent decisions by federal courts of
appeals involving section 1 Sherman Act challenges to group boycotts
by health care professionals. Finally, this comment will propose an appropriate standard of antitrust review for the exclusionary conduct of
health care professionals in light of the relevant and contemporary Supreme Court and lower federal court pronouncements on this issue.
The proposed standard of antitrust review will find as its basis the
conclusion to be reached by this comment: Group boycotts by health
care professionals generally involve different considerations than the
similar practices of traditional commercial entities. Consequently, it is
urged that group boycotts by medical professionals ought not be uniformly and automatically condemned as per se illegal. Instead, it is
asserted that the self-regulatory, competency-based justifications offered by health care professionals for their exclusionary conduct raise
sufficiently delicate questions to remove the conduct from per se condemnation. Accordingly, courts should apply the rule-of-reason balancing approach to determine whether the challenged conduct, considered
in light of the proffered self-regulatory justifications, has an overall
pro-competitive effect. The position of this comment is that such a ruleof-reason balancing analysis of the conduct of health care professionals
is worthy of acceptance, even when the necessary deference to Supreme
Court precedent condemning group boycotts as per se illegal is
considered.
II.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM: INTERESTS OF THE EXCLUDED
PROFESSIONAL

Anticompetitive behavior aimed at professionals takes a variety of
forms, ranging from tying arrangements 7 and price-fixing agreements, 8
to exclusive contracts 9 and group boycotts." Group boycotts or con7. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984). A tying
arrangement is "an agreement by a party.to sell one product but only on the condition that the
buyer also purchase a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that
product from any other supplier." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)
(footnote omitted).
8. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (maximum
fee schedules agreed upon by foundation member physicians were per se illegal); Pennsylvania
Dental Ass'i v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1984) (challenge to prepaid dental
service program), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2021 (1985).
9. See. e.g., Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hosp. Medical Center, 733 F.2d 1007
Published
eCommons,
1985 between hospital and firm of anesthesiologists challenged under nu(2d by
Cir.)
(exclusive contract
merous antitrust theories), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 253 (1984).
10. See Weiss v. York Host.. 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984). cert. denied. 105 S. Ct. 1777
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certed refusals to deal with health care professionals are particularly
interesting because such conduct can range from the denial of hospital
admitting privileges to a physician or other practitioner, to the denial
of membership status in a professional association. What is at stake for
the excluded practitioner is often his or her livelihood because denials
of staff privileges or association membership status place the professional at a competitive disadvantage.
With respect to hospital admitting privileges," a physician or
other health care practitioner faces a number of competitive disadvantages when denied the use of a hospital's services and equipment. First,
a practitioner without admitting privileges will find the need to refer
patients to physicians with admitting privileges in order to adequately
meet the needs and demands of his or her patients. 2 Not only does the
necessity of making a referral result in a loss of revenue to the practitioner for the current services he cannot supply, but the excluded practitioner also faces the risk of permanently losing a patient to a practitioner with admitting privileges who obtained the referral.' 3 Second,

(1985); Hayden v. Bracy, 744 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1984); Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2398 (1984); Mishler v. St. Anthony's Hosp. Sys., 694 F.2d
1225 (10th Cir. 1981); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981); McElhinney v. Medical Protective Co., 549 F.
Supp. 121 (E.D. Ky. 1982); Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
McDonald v. Saint Joseph's Hosp. of Atlanta, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Robinson
v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd mem., 688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 971 (1982); Malini v. Singleton & Assocs., 516 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Feldman
v. Jackson Memorial Hosp., 509 F. Supp. 815 (S.D. Fla. 1981), aff'd, 752 F.2d 647 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3504 (1985).
II. Generally, hospital admitting privileges refer to the right of a physician or other practitioner to admit patients and to direct the care given to them at a particular hospital, with such
privileges usually limited to matters within the practitioner's medical specialty. Dolan & Ralston,
Hospital Admitting Privileges and the Sherman Act, 18 Hous. L. REV. 707, 709-10 (1981).
More specifically, the term "'medical staff privilege' refers to the right of a physician or dentist to
participate in a hospital's governing structure as a member of its medical staff, and the term
.clinical privilege' refers to any health care practitioner's right to perform medical procedures
within the hospital." Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges:
Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CAL. L. REV. 595, 596 n.1 (1982). Unless indicated otherwise in this comment, the terms "admitting privilege" or "'staff privilege" are intended to mean
the right of a physician to admit patients and to participate in the governing structure of a
hospital.
12. Dolan & Ralston, supra note 11, at 713-14. Admitting privileges will often be imperative for a practitioner who relies on high technology equipment for diagnostic and recuperative
functions in rendering medical services. Id. at 713.
13. Id. at 714. Additionally, the denial of admitting privileges indirectly affects the consumer-patient's potential medical costs and freedom of choice as to a particular practitioner. Id. at
719-21.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
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the physician who is denied admitting privileges faces an even greater
disadvantage in that the absence of staff privileges often carries the
negative connotation that the person is. a "second-class practitioner."' 4
This stigma of inferiority certainly affects a competent physician's
competitive position when it is apparent that a potential patient has
numerous practitioners to choose from. 15 Finally, another disadvantage
faced by the excluded practitioner is that of foregone business opportunities because professionals with staff privileges often obtain new business while performing services in a hospital through referrals from
other physicians, and from patients who enter a hospital with no chosen
physician.' 6
A comparable list of competitive disadvantages also faces the
practitioner who is denied membership status in a professional association of his or her peers. First, a practitioner who is denied full membership status in a medical, dental, or other professional association will
often lose the referral business that members provide one another
through devices such as membership listings.1 7 Additionally, the professional who is denied membership status obviously faces the "secondclass practitioner" stigma that also accompanies the denial of hospital
admitting privileges.
In sum, it is clear that competent practitioners who otherwise meet
the statutory requirements to practice in a particular profession will,
nevertheless, be placed at a competitive disadvantage if denied admitting privileges or associational status that other members of the particular profession have secured. This dilemma raises the paramount issue
confronting current antitrust analysis of the activities of health care
professionals and suggests the balancing of two competing considerations. Namely, can the federal antitrust laws be utilized to eliminate
professional group boycotts motivated by anticompetitive animus, while
still preserving legitimate professional self-regulation aimed at maintaining and improving the competency as well as the professional conduct of members of a particular profession?

14. Id. at 714.
15. There are numerous statistics supporting the proposition that if there is not already a
large supply of physicians bordering on market saturation, there will be a vast increase in the per
capita ratio of physicians to population by 1990. See Leibenluft & Pollard, Antitrust Scrutiny of
the Health Professions:Developing a Frameworkfor Assessing Private Restraints, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 927, 931 (1981). See also Alpert & McCarthy, Beyond Goldfarb: Applying Traditional
Antitrust Analysis to Changing Health Care Markets, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 165, 183 (1984)
(estimates are that the physician supply will increase by 44% between 1978 and 1990).
16. Dolan & Ralston, supra note 11, at 714.
17. See, e.g., Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1484 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (evidence demonstrated that membership listings of professional associations are utilized by members to facilitate patient referrals).
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The scope of the professional group boycott dilemma can best be
illustrated by reviewing a contemporary case involving a group boycott
by physicians with hospital admitting privileges against a doctor seeking such privileges. In Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episcopal-MemorialMedical Center,18 an osteopathic physician 9 brought an action under section 1 of the Sherman Act alleging that the board of trustees of two
hospitals, and their respective medical staffs, had acted in concert in
refusing to grant the physician admitting privileges. It was clear that
the plaintiff in this action was faced with a distinct competitive disadvantage because the defendant medical center managed and controlled
both hospitals in the community where the physician practiced. 20 However, the physician was allegedly denied admitting privileges after repeated applications solely because of his status as an osteopathic physician, more commonly known as a D.O. 21 It is noteworthy that the
medical staffs of both hospitals were comprised solely of allopathic physicians, more commonly known as M.D.S.2
More important is the fact that the osteopath in question sought
admitting privileges as a general practitioner. Today, it is well established that there is no qualitative difference in the medical skill, expertise, or competence of general practice D.O.'s as compared to that of
general practice M.D.'s.2 3 Thus, these facts, as well as the fact that the
hospitals in question had not granted admitting privileges to any
D.O.'s, provided persuasive support for the argument that the practice
in question was simply a group boycott by M.D.'s against D.O.'s in
general, which was not based on competency considerations, but was
instead grounded on the anticompetitive animus of the M.D.'s on the
defendant's medical staffs.

18. 513 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1975).
19. Osteopathic physicians are members of the school of medical thought known as osteopathy, which is -[a] system of complete medical practice based on the maintenance of proper relationships among the various parts of the body. Osteopathic physicians, licensed in all 50 states,
employ manipulative therapy, drugs, surgery, x-ray, and all other accepted therapeutic methods in
the treatment of disease and injury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 992 (5th ed. 1979). Osteopathic
physicians signify their degree as D.O. The traditional school of medical thought is that of allopathy. Allopathic physicians signify their degree as M.D. For a more detailed discussion on osteopathic and allopathic physicians, see Blackstone, supra note 4, at 406-10.
20. Wolf, 513 F.2d at 685.
21. Id.
22. Id. The bylaws of many medical staffs and hospitals prohibit the granting of admitting
privileges to osteopathic physicians. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 794 (3d Cir.
1984) (both York Hospital's corporate charter and the medical staff's bylaws barred D.O.'s from
obtaining admitting privileges until 1974), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985).
23. After reviewing the evidence, Professor Blackstone arrived at the conclusion that the
"quality of osteopaths has for a long time been comparable to that of M.D.'s." Blackstone, supra
note 4, at 425. In fact, all 50 states currently license osteopathic physicians to practice medicine.
See supra note 19.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
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Yet, in affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim-that the
questioned denial of admitting privileges was a per se illegal group boycott 2 -the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit demonstrates the legal uncertainties faced by health care professionals relying on the Sherman Act for a private remedy in response to the
exclusionary conduct of their peers. Not only did the physician face the
now outdated contention that the learned professions are exempt from
the Sherman Act,2 5 but the plaintiff also faced the jurisdictional argument that the defendant's provision of hospital services did not substantially affect interstate commerce. 6 In fact, the Wolf court avoided
analysis of the so-called "learned profession" exemption contention by
dismissing the osteopath's complaint for failure to satisfy the interstate
27
commerce requirement.
The Wolf case is particularly relevant to the issues that will be
addressed by this comment. First, the case illustrates the fact that
group boycotts by health care professionals are not always premised on
legitimate "public interest" justifications such as the competency of a
practitioner; health care professionals often do have competitive interests at stake in denying a beneficial, desired status to fellow practitioners.2 8 Second, even when a court reaches and demonstrates a willingness to analyze the justifications offered by health care professionals for
their boycott of a practitioner, the excluded professional will, nevertheless, have to first satisfy a number of legal hurdles before the Sherman
Act will provide an attractive private remedy.2 9 With this background

24. Wolf, 513 F.2d at 685.
25. Id. at 686. For a discussion on the demise of the "learned profession" exemption, see
infra text accompanying notes 30-39.
26. Wolf, 513 F.2d at 686. For a discussion of the interstate commerce requirement, see
infra text accompanying notes 115-28.
27. Wolf, 513 F.2d at 688.
28. In the hospital admitting privilege context, once physicians with privileges realize the
economic advantages of receiving referrals, rather than making them, as well as not being considered "second-class practitioners," such physicians will also recognize that "[t]hese advantages diminish in direct proportion to the number of other physicians who enjoy similar privileges. Therefore, the decision to grant privileges in one's own specialty or subspecialty involves the diminution
of one's own competitive advantage." Dolan & Ralston, supra note 11, at 715. Moreover, as profit
maximizers, health care professionals are presumably aware of the fact that "[c]onventional economic wisdom predicts that as the supply of practitioners in a relevant specialty area increases,
the price of services will decrease if demand remains constant." Id. at 716. Some commentators
assert, however, that the health care industry does not respond to the normal forces of supply and
demand. See Leibenluft & Pollard, supra note 15, at 930. Nevertheless, these commentators do
concede that health care professionals will respond to competitive pressures by "circling the wagons" to fend off potential competition. Id. at 931. Furthermore, the existence of competing medical ideologies, such as that between osteopaths and allopaths, often complements the economic
realities and results in exclusionary tactics by members of the respective professions. See Blackstone, supra note 4, at 411 -17.
29. eCommons,
These hurdles,1985
which can essentially be inferred from the language of § I of the SherPublished by
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in mind, it will be appropriate to analyze these legal obstacles through
a review of Supreme Court decisions dealing with the learned professions, and through an analysis of the Court's precedent in the group
boycott arena.
II1.
A.

THE SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS

The Demise of the So-Called "Learned Profession" Exemption

Until 1975, the use of the antitrust laws, as a private remedy to
challenge the anticompetitive practices of professionals, was not effective. Learned professionals were essentially deemed immune from antitrust liability because the providing of "services" was not considered
"trade or commerce" and was, therefore, not within the reach of the
Sherman Act.3 0 Moreover, another justification often asserted for this
"implied" immunity from the Sherman Act was that the learned professions did not have as their objective the enhancement of profits, but
instead existed to serve the public by providing important and necessary services.3 1 However, in a case where both of the above justifications were utilized in reaching the holding that the practice of law was
not trade or commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act,3 2 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit directly placed before the Supreme Court the "learned profession" exemption issue in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar.3

man Act, require the plaintiff to prove: (1) concerted action, (2) an unreasonable restraint on
trade, and (3) a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See supra note 2. Private persons now
have standing to sue under the Sherman Act for treble damages for injury to their business pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
30. Thus, as stated by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: "[I1f a group of doctors
conspire to restrain the practice of another doctor there is no Sherman Act violation because that
which is restrained (i.e., the practice of a learned profession, medicine) is neither trade nor commerce." Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 15 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773
(1975).
31. Id. at 14.
32. Id. at 15.
33. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Goldfarb involved a challenge to a bar association's minimum fee
schedule for real estate services. This case was not, however, the first opportunity presented to the
Supreme Court for dealing with the "learned profession" exemption issue. In American Medical
Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), the Court faced a group boycott by the AMA and
its members against a prepaid medical service corporation that sought to employ physicians on a
full-time, risk-sharing basis. However, the Court avoided the "learned profession" exemption
question by focusing on the object of the boycott, Group Health, which the Court characterized as
"a membership corporation engaged in business or trade." Id. at 528. Moreover, nine years later,
the Court again faced a group boycott by physicians of prepaid group practices in United States v.
Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952). Once again, the Court avoided the "learned
profession" exemption issue by simply finding that the lower court was correct in not issuing an
injunction in 1949 for any behavior of the defendants that may have occurred in 1941. Id. at
332-34. Nevertheless, the Court did issue some important dictum that has carried over to its more
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
recent decisions in asserting that the usual forms of business competition could be "demoralizing
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In attacking this issue, the Supreme Court noted that there was a
"heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" to the Sherman Act;
in fact, this Act contained no legislative history supporting such a
broad implied "learned profession" exemption to the extensive, competition-oriented mandate of the statute.3" Therefore, in rejecting the argument for such an implied exemption to the reach of the Sherman
Act, the Court stated, "The nature of an occupation, standing alone,
does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act . . .nor is the public service aspect of professional practice controlling in determining
whether [section] 1 includes professions." 3 5 After rejecting the "public
service" justifications upon which the Fourth Circuit relied, the Supreme Court reached the controlling issue of whether legal services
could be considered "trade or commerce." The Court, however, had
little difficulty in holding that "the exchange of such a service for
money is 'commerce' in the most common usage of that word." 36
In holding that the practice of law was within the reach of the
37
Sherman Act and condemning the price-fixing arrangement at issue,
the Supreme Court, nevertheless, introduced uncertainty into its decision through the use of a footnote.38 Specifically, the Court stated in its
now infamous footnote 17:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to
view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business
activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and
other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any other
situation than the one with which we are confronted today.3 9
This strong statement by the Court makes it apparent that in contexts
other than price-fixing, the Court considered it to be "unrealistic," con-

to the ethical standards of a profession." Id. at 336.
34. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787-88.
35. Id. at 787.
36. Id. at 787-88. It is noteworthy that Goldfarb was a unanimous decision by the Court
with Justice Powell not participating in the case.
37. See id. at 788, 793.
38. In commenting on this uncertainty, one commentator has stated: "I suppose the inclusion of a footnote is understandable. After all, Supreme Court justices are people too, a rather
basic point we all sometimes forget, and the death of this traditional concept may not have come
easily to them." Sims, Maricopa: Are the Professions Different?, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 177, 179
(1983).
Published 39.
by eCommons,
Goldfarb, 4211985
U.S. at 788 n.17 (emphasis added).
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sidering the "public service aspect" of a particular profession, to treat
the activities of professionals as solely motivated by the objective of
traditional business entities-profitability. But, in providing this dictum, the Court did not offer any specific guidance as to when and how
the learned professions "may" be treated differently than other business entities in the antitrust equation.
It is common knowledge in legal circles that the interpretation of
Supreme Court footnotes is a matter for litigants-the Goldfarb footnote certainly has been no exception. The Court was forced to deal
with the breadth of its dictum in National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v. United States,40 the Supreme Court's next major case involving a learned profession. In National Society of ProfessionalEngineers
(NSPE), the Court was faced with the issue of whether the lower federal courts should have considered the merits behind the professional
association's canon of ethics prohibiting competitive bidding by its
member engineers. 41 The lower courts had refused to consider the defendant's argument-that its canon prohibiting competitive bidding
was necessary to preserve the "quality of engineering"-because of the
view that this professional association regulation constituted a "tampering with the price structure" and was, therefore, unlawful on its face;
in antitrust terminology, the practice in question constituted per se illegal price-fixing. 42 The engineering society, however, argued in substance that under the Goldfarb footnote, its ethical canon should be
considered reasonable because it protected the public from deceptive
engineering practices fostered by competitive bidding. 4 Thus, the pro-

40.
41.

435 U.S. 679 (1978).
Id. at 681. The Court recognized engineering as an "important and learned profession."

id.
42. Id. at 685-86. The approach taken by the lower federal courts in NSPE exemplifies the
essence of the per se method of antitrust analysis. Specifically, when the questioned conduct is
found to fit within a prohibited category because of its pernicious effect on competition, the court's
inquiry ends, and it refuses to consider any defense or justification based on the reasonableness of
the defendant's conduct. See Leibenluft & Pollard, supra note 15, at 937. See also supra note 5.
To date, the practices falling within the forbidden category and "which the courts have heretofore
deemed unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and
tying arrangements." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (citations omitted). See also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1556 n.10 (1984).
The other complimentary branch of antitrust analysis is that based on the rule-of-reason
which involves an in-depth analysis of the challenged conduct through consideration of such variables as "the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was
imposed." NSPE, 435 U.S. at 692 (emphasis added). The ultimate determination to be made
under the rule-of-reason is "whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or
one that suppresses competition." Id. at 691. Of course, if the overall effect of the challenged
restraint is to suppress competition, it falls under § I of the Sherman Act.
43. NSPE, 435 U.S. at 687. The Goldfarb footnote is reproduced in the text. See supra text
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
accompanying note 39.
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fessional association contended that its practice should receive rule-ofreason treatment rather than being condemned automatically as per se
illegal.
Importantly, in addressing these contentions the Supreme Court
affirmed the validity of the reasoning underlying the Goldfarb footnote.
Although the Court asserted that the cautionary footnote 17 did not
create a broad exemption for, the learned professions under the guise of
the rule-of-reason, the Court did indicate that the nature of competition between professionals and other business entities may differ "significantly," and, therefore, "[e]thical norms may serve to regulate and
44
promote this competition, and thus fall within the Rule of Reason."
Nevertheless, after considering the justifications offered by the engineers, ostensibly under the rule-of-reason," the Court rejected the
use of the proffered ethical canon as an affirmative defense to the pricefixing at issue. Specifically, the Court strongly condemned the engineering society's contention that the presence of price competition in
engineering services endangered public safety; in the Court's view, such
an argument was "nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.""' Moreover, the Court asserted that the society's contention was untenable under the Sherman Act because "the
Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption
' 7
that competition itself is unreasonable.'

44. NSPE, 435 U.S. at 696. Importantly, the Court also indicated that to be upheld under
the rule-of-reason, such "ethical norms" could not have any "anticompetitive effect." See id. at
696 n.22. But see infra note 47.
45. There is uncertainty as to whether the Court was condemning the practice at issue as
per se illegal, or whether the Court was engaging in a rule-of-reason analysis. The distinction
between these two methods of antitrust analysis is important to litigants. See supra notes 5 & 42.
That the Court condemned the ban on competitive bidding as per se illegal is evidenced by the
following statement, "On itsface, this agreement restrains trade within the meaning of § I of the
Sherman Act." NSPE, 435 U.S. at 693 (emphasis added). That the Court gave rule-of-reason
treatment to the ethical canon at issue is evidenced by the Court's extensive pronouncement on
this method of antitrust analysis. See id. at 687-96. Commentators have differing opinions on this
issue. See Hauvighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978
DUKE L.J. 303, 348 n.194; Leibenluft & Pollard, supra note 15, at 938; Sims, supra note 38, at
179-80; Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemptions,
Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 265, 323 (1979). It
is apparent that at least three members of the Supreme Court believe that the price-fixing in
NSPE was condemned as pe se illegal. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S.
332, 362 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J.). For further
analysis of NSPE and Maricopa, see infra text accompanying notes 50-53.
46. NSPE, 435 U.S. at 695. In the Court's view, Congress made the decision that competition was the mandate of the Sherman Act because the philosophy that "competition is the best
method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain--quality,
service, safety, and durability-and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free
opportunity to select among alternative offers." Id.
Published47.by Id.
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After the Supreme Court's decision in NSPE, it is clear that the
Goldfarb footnote, offering a basis for different antitrust treatment of
the learned professions in at least some situations, has continued vitality. "'8 Furthermore, the Court did provide some specific guidance for
interpreting footnote 17 in that a professional norm cannot be justified
through a contention that competition itself is bad for a particular profession; the Court also arguably decided that no differential treatment
is forthcoming to professionals engaged in price-fixing. 4 9 Nevertheless,
it is also plausible that the Court in NSPE permitted a professional
association's ethical canon to be analyzed under the rule-of-reason even
though the practice at issue, price-fixing, would normally be considered, automatically, per se illegal. Thus, an optimistic argument for the
learned professions is that the thrust of NSPE is as follows: If a professional association justifies its challenged conduct based on an ethical
norm designed to protect the public, the restraint, such as a group boycott, which would normally be considered per se illegal, will instead be
analyzed under the rule-of-reason to determine whether the overall effect of the practice is pro-competitive. 50 It is apparent that many lower

art, White, Marshall, and Powell joined Justice Stevens' majority opinion-the concurring opinion
of Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Rehnquist, is important in providing guidance for analyzing professional group boycotts under the Sherman Act. Justice Blackmun refused to adhere to
the Court's reasoning insofar as it inferred that "any ethical rule with an overall anticompetitive
effect promulgated by a professional society is forbidden by the Sherman Act." Id. at 699 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In his view, the Goldfarb decision "properly left to the Court some flexibility
in considering how to apply traditional Sherman Act concepts to professions long'consigned to
self-regulation." Id. Moreover, Justice Blackmun asserted that he was "not at all certain that the
Court le[ft] enough elbowroom for realistic application of the Sherman Act to professional services," because "there may be ethical rules which have a more than de minimis anticompetitive
effect and yet are important in a profession's proper ordering." Id. at 701, 700. Thus, in essence,
Justice Blackmun objected to the Court's detailed shaping of the rule-of-reason "to such a narrow
last.
... Id. at 700.
48. As one commentator stated: "[Tihe Court kept the coals burning, and invited the continuing efforts to find the free fire zone for the professions that the Supreme Court keeps hinting
really does exist somewhere out there." Sims, supra note 38, at 180.
49. This statement is, of course, premised on a conclusion that the Supreme Court applied
the per se branch of antitrust analysis in NSPE rather than the rule-of-reason. See supra note 45
and accompanying text.
50. In fact, Justice Blackmun provided support for such an argument in his concurring
opinion- in NSPE where, in discussing the de minimis anticompetitive effect that may accompany
a learned profession's ethical standards, he stated: "A medical association's prescription of standards of minimum competence for licensing or certification may lessen the number of entrants."
NSPE, 435 U.S. at 700-01 (Blackmun, J. concurring). The fact that the number of entrants in a
particular profession is decreased by an ethical norm does not necessarily mean that the overall
effect of the ethical standard is to decrease competition; to the contrary, ensuring that medical
practitioners, for example, are competent before being granted desired status can serve an overall
pro-competitive function by increasing the efficiency and quality of medical care rendered to the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
ultimate benefit of consumer-patients. See infra text accompanying notes 155-56.

1985]

COMMENT

courts have taken the invitation offered by NSPE.51
That NSPE kept the "coals burning" is certain when the arguments raised by the defendants in the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society52 are considered. In
Maricopa, the specific holding of the Court was that agreements
among competing physicians setting the maximum fees they would
claim in payment for health services to policy holders of specified insurance plans were per se illegal price-fixing contracts. 3 Maricopa is important to the instant analysis because of a statement made by the
Court in the context of rejecting the physicians' arguments for relief
from the per se rule condemning maximum, as well as minimum, pricefixing. Specifically, in asserting that the medical profession could not
be distinguished from any other provider of services simply because the
defendants' plan sought to make it easier for patients to pay for services rendered, the Court commented that the price-fixing agreements
in question were not "premised on public service or ethical norms. '"84
Thus, the fact that the Court recited the Goldfarb footnote, and noted
the NSPE "public service or ethical norms" justification as a potential
defense in the process of rejecting the defendants' argument for relief
from the per se rule, leads reasonably to the inference that had the
physicians made such an argument, their conduct would have been analyzed under the rule-of-reason. 5
Although the Supreme Court in Maricopa did not add anything
substantively to the Goldfarb footnote as interpreted in NSPE, the
Court did keep alive the debate on whether the learned professions may
receive different antitrust treatment. The fact that these decisions provide a basis for presenting a tenable argument for different treatment
of professionals is further "fueled" by some very recent footnote comments by the Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No.

51. See infra text accompanying notes 129-97.
52. 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (Stevens, J.).
53. Id. at 335-36. In so holding, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit which had utilized the rule-of-reason in analyzing the conduct at issue. Id.
54. Id. at 349. Also rejected was an argument that the Court should not apply the per se
rule to the price-fixing at issue because the "judiciary has little antitrust experience in the health
care industry." Id. As the Court noted, the defendants' "argument should not be confused with
the established position that a new per se rule is not justified until the judiciary obtains considerable rule-of-reason experience with the particular type of restraint challenged." Id. at 349 n.19.
55. One commentator asserts that "the statement in Maricopa is just silly ...." Sims,
supra note 38, at 181. However, Mr. Sims does concede that the interpretation of Maricopa argued for in the text is plausible because, as he states, "maybe the Court means that the argument
that a restraint is justified by an increase in the quality of professional service is a legitimate one
which . . . may be successful." Id. In sum, even with the differing interpretations of the Court's
Published
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2 v. Hyde."
In Jefferson Parish, the Court held that an exclusive contract between a hospital and a firm of anesthesiologists was not a per se illegal
tying arrangement and that the contract in question, although it resulted in the denial of admitting privileges to an otherwise qualified
anesthesiologist, passed muster under the rule-of-reason.5 7 The Court
was, however, also cognizant of the fact that the district court "intimated that the principle of per se liability might not apply to cases
involving the medical profession. '58 Unfortunately, the Court was not
forced to directly decide the correctness of such a blanket rule-of-reason approach, because on appeal, the petitioning hospital and firm of
anesthesiologists assumed that "the same principles apply to the provision of professional services as apply to other trades or businesses. ' 5
Nevertheless, the Court did provide some important insight regarding the availability of differential treatment for the learned professions by stating that "we have refused to tolerate manifestly anticompetitive conduct simply because the health care industry is involved." 0
In fact, the Court gave a strong indication that it would not offer different treatment to professionals when the challenged restraint was a
tying arrangement. Specifically, the Court rejected the view that the
legality of a tying arrangement involving medical services turns on
"whether it was adopted for the purpose of improving patient care." '
Thus, in essence, the Court rejected any analysis of tying arrangements
in the health care industry based upon an inquiry into whether the arrangement was adopted for a "public service or ethical norms" purpose.
At first glance, these comments by the Supreme Court in Jefferson
Parish appear to work against the argument that health care profes-

56. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
57. At issue in Jefferson Parish was a challenge to an exclusive contract between the hospital and a firm of anesthesiologists which required that all anesthesiological services for patients of
the hospital be performed by this firm. The challenger of this contract was an anesthesiologist who
was denied admission to the hospital's medical staff. He alleged that the hospital conditioned its
surgical services to those patients who agreed to use only the anesthesiological services provided by
the firm and that this practice constituted a per se illegal tying arrangement. Id. at 1554. The
Court refused to classify this particular tying arrangement as per se illegal because the hospital
did not have sufficient market power to "force" patients to use the services of the contracted
anesthesiological firm. Id. at 1566. Instead, the Court applied the rule-of-reason to the exclusive
contract in question and found that there was no evidence demonstrating that the arrangement
had an adverse effect on competition. Id. at 1568.
58. Id. at 1556 n.12. In fact, the district court had applied rule-of-reason analysis to this
apparent per se illegal trade restraint, and found the anticompetitive consequences of the contract
to be "minimal and outweighed by benefits in the form of improved patient care." Id. at 1554.
59. Id. at 1556 n.12. In recognizing the petitioners' posture on appeal, however, the Court
did cite generally to NSPE. Id.
60. Id. at 1565 n.42.
61. Id. at 1565 n.41.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
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sionals are entitled to different treatment under section 1 of the Sherman Act than that afforded commercial entities. However, it is necessary to analyze the context in which the Court's statements were made.
Specifically, the Court was analyzing an innovative type of tying arrangement, the anticompetitive effects of which occur when the market
power of the defendant hospital in the tying product (surgical services
and equipment) is used to "force" consumer-patients to purchase the
unwanted product (anesthesiological services from the particular firm
of anesthesiologists)., 2 If anticompetitive "forcing" occurred, consumer-patients would be denied the opportunity to choose a particular
anesthesiologist because of their need for this particular hospital's surgical services. Thus, the focus of antitrust analysis was on whether the
defendant hospital had sufficient market power to "force" consumerpatients to forego their free choice. Therefore, the presence of any patient care motive underlying the exclusive contract, attacked as a tyiiig
arrangement, was irrelevant for analysis of this particular trade
restraint.
After the Jefferson Parish decision, some conclusions can reasonably be made regarding whether the Supreme Court will offer differ-ent
antitrust treatment to professionals engaged in certain trade practices.
First, the Court will not tolerate "manifestly anticompetitive conduct"
simply because a learned profession is involved. However, to date,;.the
Court has only condemned price-fixing agreements and certain tying
arrangements as manifestly anticompetitive in cases involving a learnoed
profession.6 3 Second, the Court has been very cautious in not totally
eliminating the propriety of an argument based on the Goldfarb footnote as interpreted in NSPE and Maricopa-that is, in certain situations, because of the "public service aspect" of a particular learned
profession, the concerted conduct of its members requires different antitrust analysis than that traditionally accorded other business
64
entities.

62. See id. at 1559.
63. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (tying
arrangement involving health care professionals where requisite elements for per se illegality are
present); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (price-fixing); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (price-fixing); Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (price-fixing).
64. That the Court is careful in not eliminating the thrust of the Goldfarb footnote is evidenced by a statement in Jefferson Parish: "[W]e reject the view of the District Court that the
legality of an arrangementof this kind turns on whether it was adopted for the purpose of improving patient care." 104 S. Ct. at 1565 n.41 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court, in all the relevant
professional cases decided to date, has not categorically rejected the notion that there may be
grounds for differential antitrust analysis of certain professional conduct, such as group boycotts
premised upon "public service or ethical norms" justifications.
by health
care professionals
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In summary, the Supreme Court has not eliminated the implications behind the reasoning of the infamous Goldfarb footnote 17 and
has instead kept the "coals burning," even in the Court's most recent
case touching upon this issue. Although the Court has uniformly condemned price-fixing and certain tying arrangements by professionals as
per se illegal, the Court has not yet directly addressed the issue of
group boycotts by health care professionals. It is asserted that group
boycotts are the type of trade restraint best suited for. application of a
different standard of antitrust analysis, at least in the health care profession, because such exclusionary conduct can result in legitimate and
beneficial self-regulation of a professional by his or her professional
peers. If such "watchdog" activity is motivated by competency-based
considerations designed to safeguard the well-being of patients, this
would certainly be a "public service aspect" of the particular health
care profession that should be considered by courts in rule-of-reason
analyses. Thus, in considering the analysis to follow of the Supreme
Court's decisions condemning group boycotts as per se illegal, it will be
useful to consider whether the Court would, if faced with this issue
today, condemn legitimate self-regulation by health care professionals
based on competency considerations as a per se illegal group boycott,
especially when there is an absence of underlying anticompetitive animus. If faced with this issue today, it is asserted that the Court ought
not condemn the practice outright, but rather should analyze the "boycott" under the rule-of-reason.
B.

The Per Se Illegality of Group Boycotts

Group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal involve a broad range
of commercial as well as noncommercial activity. In the commercial
setting, group boycotts generally refer to "an agreement by two or
more persons not to do business with other individuals, or to do business with them only on specified terms." 6 5 The concern of the Sherman
Act in condemning group boycotts which have as their objective the
elimination of competitors is that such conduct generally has no purpose but that of stifling existing or potential competition in order to
increase the market position of the boycotters. The pernicious effects of
concerted refusals to deal are best exemplified by the so-called "classic" boycott where there is a horizontal combination at one trade level
which seeks to insulate itself from competition with nongroup members

65. II E. KINTER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 10.27, at 155 (1980) (quoting Note, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1531, 1531
(1958)).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
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or victims who compete, or seek to compete, at the same trade level. 6
The objective of a "classic" boycott can be effectuated by either of
two common methods. First, the group boycott can be carried out
solely at one trade level through a simple refusal of the boycotters to
deal with nongroup members."' Alternatively, the most frequently utilized method is where the boycott spans two trade levels and is accomplished through coercion whereby the participants in the boycott put
pressure on their suppliers or customers to stop dealing with nongroup
members or else face the risk of losing the boycotters' business or product, respectively."
In the context of the health care profession, group boycott activity
does exist and can be effectuated by both of the methods described
above. For example, because professionals often find it both prudent
and necessary to deal and consult with one another, there can be a onelevel boycott where members of a medical association combine together
and concertedly refuse to deal with nonmembers by denying such practitioners membership status. 69 Alternatively, there can be a two-level
boycott involving health care professionals that is akin to the classic
two-level commercial boycott where "independent contractor" physicians of a hospital's medical staff combine to pressure the hospital's
board of trustees to deny staff privileges to an otherwise qualified physician. 70 Thus, although so-called "group boycotts" by health care practitioners can often be justified as legitimate self-regulation based on the
"public service aspect" of the particular profession, such conduct is deserving of careful antitrust scrutiny because of the anticompetitive effects group boycotts can have on the "victims" and the health care
market in general when the challenged conduct has the objective of
eliminating competitors, actual or potential.
The Supreme Court has engaged in a careful scrutiny of conduct

66. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 83, at 230 (1977).
67. Id. Professor Sullivan asserts that such a one-level boycott is common where members
of the trade find it necessary to deal with one another in their business (i.e., brokers). Id.
68. As Professor Sullivan states, "The boycotting group members, in effect, say to their
suppliers or to their customers, 'If you don't stop dealing with nongroup members, we will stop
dealing with you.'" Id.
69. See, e.g., Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (dental specialty association denial of full membership status to a periodontologist). For an
in-depth analysis of the Kreuzer case, see infra text accompanying notes 160-80. Professor Sullivan argues that such a "boycott" may not have the pernicious anticompetitive effects of the classic
boycott, and that such conduct may serve a self-regulatory purpose as well as have beneficial procompetitive effects. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 66, § 88, at 247-53.
70. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1777 (1985); Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episcopal-Memorial Medical Center, 513 F.2d 684 (10th Cir.
1975). For an in-depth analysis of the recent Weiss decision, see infra notes 132-59 and accompaPublished
eCommons,
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text.
For an analysis
of the Wolf case, see supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
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resembling group boycotts, and has consistently condemned as per se
illegal, commercial group boycotts.7 1 The Court's first and most extensive antitrust analysis of group boycott activity occurred in Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC.72 In Fashion Originators'
Guild of America, the trade practice at issue was in essence a two-level
boycott whereby a number of garment design manufacturers (FOGA)
combined to combat manufacturers who were copying their "original"
garment designs. 73 In dealing with the so-called "style pirates," FOGA
members pressured retailers into not dealing with the "style pirates" by
threatening to terminate sales of their products to retailers stocking
products with copied designs. 74 Thus, although the targets of the group
boycott were the "style pirates," FOGA effectuated its objective by applying pressure on' retailers. In condemning this unfair trade practice,
the Court asserted that the FTC was correct in refusing to consider or
hear the proffered justifications of the defendants regarding the reasonableness of their action.7 5 Because the Court refused to consider
FOGA's justifications for its "organized boycott," this case signified an
early indication by the Court that group boycotts are per se illegal.
The Supreme Court next addressed the group boycott issue in
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,7 6 where the practice in
question was Broadway-Hale's use of its retail market power to pressure suppliers of brand name appliances to stop dealing with Klor's, a
discount appliance store.7 7 In condemning this practice based on its
"interference with the natural flow of interstate commerce" and its

71. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (group boycotts
are per se illegal). See also supra note 42. Judge Bork, however, asserts that "[tihe belief that all
boycotts are illegal per se rests upon an uncritical acceptance of repeated Supreme Court pronouncements to that effect." R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 330 (1978). It must be noted,
however, that litigators are left with unambiguous Supreme Court pronouncements to this effect,
which are, currently, "the law."
72. 312 U.S. 457 (1941). An earlier case that was important in the development of antitrust
analysis of group boycotts was Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234
U.S. 600 (1914).
73. Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., 312 U.S. at 461.
74. Id. See supra text accompanying note 68.
75. Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., 312 U.S. at 467-68. The Court affirmed the FTC's
condemnation of the challenged practice under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act but also
noted that the boycott was prohibited conduct under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Id. at
466-68. The justifications offered by the defendants were that " 'the practices of FOGA were
reasonable and necessary to protect the manufacturer, laborer, retailer and consumer against the
devastating evils growing from the pirating of original designs .... .' " Id. at 467. Note, however,
that FOGA's original fabric designs were neither copyrighted nor patented. Id. at 461.
76. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
77. Id. at 209. In Judge Bork's opinion, Klor's was simply a "free rider," and thus, the
powerful Broadway-Hale sought to eliminate the discounter. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 332 (1978).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
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"monopolistic tendency," 7 8 the Court commented that this boycott was
a member of the class of restraints, that by its nature and character, is
"unduly restrictive" and thus in the "forbidden category. ' 79 The Supreme Court's strong condemnation of this concerted refusal to deal
with Klor's, as well as the Court's refusal to consider justifications offered by the defendants for their conduct, leads reasonably to the inference that group boycotts are per se illegal.
Finally, in 1966, the Supreme Court directly and explicitly held
that a group boycott was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act in United States v. General Motors Corp.80 The practice at issue in
General Motors was a two-level boycott whereby GM conspired with
its franchised dealers and their dealer associations to pressure a small
number of dealers to stop selling Chevrolets to discount houses in order
to eliminate the price-cutters from competition." In terming this practice a "classic conspiracy in restraint of trade," the Court held that the
group boycott was per se illegal.8 2
The General Motors decision conclusively established the Supreme
Court's position, which remains unchanged today, that group boycotts
are per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.88 With this principle in hand, it will be useful to analyze two other Supreme Court
decisions involving the group boycott activity of "trade" associations.
In Associated Press v. United States, 4 the Court was faced with a
group boycott effectuated by members of the Associated Press, who
had as their objective the prevention of nonmembers from obtaining

78. Klor's, 359 U.S. at 213.
79. Id. at 211-12.
80. 384 U.S. 127 (1966). The first case to expressly hold that group boycotts are a per se
violation of § I of the Sherman Act was probably Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light &
Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). See also Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
It is noteworthy, however, that earlier Supreme Court decisions held that group boycotts were, in
substance, per se illegal. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941).
81. See General Motors, 384 U.S. at 129-38.
82. Id. at 140, 145. Specifically, the Court stated: "There can be no doubt that the effect of
the combination or conspiracy here was to restrain trade and commerce within the meaning of the
Sherman Act. Elimination, by joint collaborative action, of discounters from access to the market
is a per se violation of the Act." Id. at 145. Importantly, in rejecting an argument that the motivation underlying the conduct in question should be considered, the Court asserted that its decision in Klor's established that a "group boycott of even a single trader violated the statute without
regard to the reasonableness of the conduct in the circumstances." Id. at 145-46 (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
83. Although the Supreme Court precedent is unambiguous to this effect, commentators
and the lower federal courts are not so convinced. Indeed, as Professor Sullivan has stated,
"[TIhere is more confusion about the scope and operation of the per se rule against group boycotts
than in reference to any other aspect of the per se doctrine." L. SULLIVAN, supra note 66, § 83, at
229-30.
U.S. I (1945).
84.by 326
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news reports compiled by the association. Although the Associated
Press' practice of limiting the dissemination of news reports to only
association members was not at issue,8 5 the practice challenged under
the Sherman Act was the requirements for gaining membership in this
association. Specifically, the United States argued that the Associated
Press unlawfully restricted its membership pursuant to bylaws which
gave a member veto power over a new applicant's membership request
when the applicant would be in competition with the member." Thus,
an Associated Press member had the power, through the association's
bylaws, to prevent a new applicant from gaining valuable Associated
Press membership, and consequently, timely news reports. 8
In condemning this practice as one obviously designed to stifle
competition, the Court strongly rejected the association's tenuous argument that no Sherman Act violation could be found because Associated
Press news reports were not "indispensable" as "adequate access" to
the reports was provided to the reading public. 8 Arguably, then, the
Associated Press decision stands for the proposition that "trade" associations cannot utilize unduly restrictive membership requirements
that, in effect, operate as a group boycott and serve as a mechanism for
eliminating competition.8 9
Another important Supreme Court decision delineating the permissible bounds of a trade association's self-regulatory activities is Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.9 In Silver, the Court was faced
with the question of how far the Exchange could go in promulgating
membership rules pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
without frustrating the antitrust policy of the Sherman Act.91 The
practices at issue in Silver were the Exchange rule requiring members
to disconnect direct telephone wire connections with nonmembers, and
the Exchange's policy of not informing nonmembers of the reasons for

85. See id. at 4.
86. Id. at 4, 8-10.
87. As the Court observed, "Inability to buy news from the largest news agency, or any one
of its multitude of members, can have the most serious effects on the publication of competitive
newspapers .
I..."
Id. at 13.
88. Id. at 18. In the Court's opinion, "The proposed 'indispensability' test would fly in the
face of the language of the Sherman Act and our previous interpretations of it." Id.
89. The exact meaning of Associated Press is not altogether clear. Some argue that, in
essence, the AP is a joint venture, rather than a trade association, and that the asset held by the
AP was so valuable that it vested the AP with a duty to provide access to that asset as if the
association were a public utility. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, supra note 66, § 89, at 253-56. Notwithstanding the disagreement, one principle is clear: "[A]rrangements or combinations designed to
stifle competition cannot be immunized by adopting a membership device accomplishing that purpose." Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 19.
90. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
91. Id. at 343.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
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disconnection.9 2
While the Court noted that the collective action of the Exchange
and its members in depriving nonmembers of wire services would have
been a per se illegal group boycott in the absence of federal securities
regulations,93 it was forced to decide whether the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 provided an exemption from section 1 Sherman Act liability because of the duty of self-regulation imposed on the Exchange by
the securities statute. In this reconciliation process, the Court balanced
the purposes behind both federal statutes and arrived at the principle
that "exchange self-regulation is to be regarded as justified in response
to antitrust charges only to the extent necessary to protect the achievement of the aims of the Securities Exchange Act . . . ."0 In holding
that this threshold of justification had not been met, and that the Exchange exceeded its statutorily-provided authority of self-regulation by
terminating, nonmembers' wire services without any procedural safeguards,9 5 the Court found that the Exchange violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 96
An immediate question that arises after a reading of the Silver
decision is the breadth of its holding. Does the requirement of fair procedures imposed by the Court in terminating services to nonmembers
extend beyond the facts of that case? This question can probably be
answered in the negative, because in Silver, the Court was faced with
balancing two federal laws and it had to make room for the self-regulation mandated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Therefore, it is
doubtful that Silver mandates a due process hearing under the guise of
the Sherman Act for any person who is denied membership status in a
trade association, nor does the case hold that procedural fairness will
rectify an otherwise per se illegal group boycott. 97 Nevertheless, consid-

92. Id. at 344.
93. Id. at 347. As the Court noted, "A valuable service germane to petitioners' business and
important to their effective competition with others was withheld from them by collective action.
That is enough to create a violation of the Sherman Act." Id. at 349 n.5.
94. Id. at 361.
95. Id. at 361-63.
96. Id. at 365.
97. Moreover, as argued by Professor Sullivan, "Silver surely does not imply that in situations where Congress has not authorized self-regulation, all that is needed to validate a program
having boycott effects is procedural fairness." L. SULLIVAN, supra note 66, § 88, at 251. Furthermore, Judge Bork argues that "the courts certainly ought not to make a due process hearing with
all joint ventures the sine qua non of all lawful refusals to deal." R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 344 (1978). In Silver, the Court specifically held:
Our decision today recognizes that the action here taken by the Exchange would
clearly be in violation of the Sherman Act unless justified by reference to the purposes of
the Securities Exchange Act, and holds that [the securities] statute affords no justification
for anticompetitive collective action taken without according fair procedures.
Silver, 373 U.S. at 364 (footnote omitted).
Published
by eCommons, 1985

66

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11:1

ering the scope of this comment, the importance of Silver is that the
Court affirmed the continued vitality of the per se rule condemning
group boycotts.
In summary, the Supreme Court decisions in Associated Press and
Silver, as well as in Fashion Originators' Guild of America, establish
that the Court's uniform condemnation of group boycotts as per se illegal is no different when trade association members are the boycotters.
Moreover, as demonstrated in General Motors, the Court has not diminished its adherence to the per se rule by considering justifications
offered by defendants regarding the reasonableness of their anticompetitive conduct. 98
The staunch position of the Supreme Court in uniformly condemning group boycotts presents the conflict which is the focus of this comment. By what method of antitrust analysis should group boycotts by
health care professionals be evaluated in light of the Goldfarb footnote? Should the per se rule be carried over to group boycotts, even
when such conduct is premised on bona fide "public service and ethical
norms" rationales, or alternatively, should such justifications remove
the questioned practice from immediate condemnation and instead require that the professional boycott be analyzed under the rule-of-reason? The position taken by this comment is that the Goldfarb footnote,
9 provides a
as developed in NSPE, Maricopa and Jefferson Parish,"
principled basis for analyzing the conduct of health care professionals
differently than that of other commercial entities when such conduct is
premised on genuine "public service or ethical norms" justifications.
Thus, when legitimate, competency-based justifications are presented,
the courts should not immediately condemn the group boycott by
health care professionals as per se illegal. Instead, courts should analyze the proffered justifications for refusing to deal with other health
care practitioners under the rule-of-reason to determine whether the
questioned conduct is pro-competitive in effect. This is the approach
ultimately taken by many lower federal courts. These courts have not,
however, reached unanimity in the reasoning utilized to reach rule-ofreason analysis, nor have these courts applied a uniform rule-of-reason
test. 100
98. That the Court has not changed its position regarding the per se illegality of group
boycotts is evidenced by a reference to the categories of per se offenses, group boycotts included,
in its recent opinion in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1556 n.10
(1984).
99. See supra notes 30-64 and accompanying text.
100. For a discussion of three pivotal decisions by federal courts of appeals involving group
boycotts effectuated by health care professionals, see infra notes 129-97 and accompanying text.
For an analysis of how lower federal courts have justifiably reached the rule-of-reason, but by
defective reasoning, see infra notes 198-241 and accompanying text. For a proposed correct rule-

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5

1985]

COMMENT

C. Supreme Court Analysis of Two Other Requirements Necessary
for a Section I Violation of the Sherman Act: The "Concert of Action" and "Effect on Interstate Commerce" Elements
1. Concerted Action
Without question, section 1 of the Sherman Act does not apply to
unilateral actions in restraint of trade, but instead only reaches conduct
involving a plurality of actors. 10 1 Thus, in order to maintain a section 1
Sherman action, there must be concerted action in that two or more
legal persons have contracted, combined, or conspired to unreasonably
10 2
restrain trade.
In the context of group boycotts by health care professionals, there
are a number of methods for proving concerted action. For example, in
cases involving denials of hospital admitting privileges, concerted action
could be shown by proof of a combination or conspiracy between the
hospital's board of trustees and its medical staff.'08 Alternatively, concerted action can plausibly be shown by proving that a combination or
conspiracy existed among the independent physicians comprising the

of-reason approach for analyzing concerted refusals to deal by health care professionals and a
discussion on why such an approach should be utilized by the courts, see infra notes 242-63 and
accompanying text.
101. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2740 (1984) (Sherman Act contains a "basic distinction between concerted and independent action").
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 of the Sherman Act is reproduced in relevant part
in the footnotes. See supra note 2.
103. Commentators argue that the physicians comprising a medical staff are more akin to
independent contractors than to employees of the hospital. See Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CAL. L. REV.
595, 638-39 (1982). The problem with the approach of treating the medical staff and the hospital
board of trustees as distinct entities is that courts may now reject such a characterization, andL
instead simply treat this relationship as analogous to that of a corporation and its unincorporated
division. See infra text accompanying notes 137-38. In Copperweld Corp., the Supreme Court
held that there could not be a Sherman Act conspiracy between a parent corporation and its
wholly-owned subsidiary. 104 S. Ct. at 2745. Moreover, the Court also reconfirmed that there
could not be concerted action between a corporation and one of its unincorporated divisions. Id. at
2741-42. Nonetheless, in commenting that officers of a single firm are not independent economic
actors, the Court left open the possibility of showing concerted action between a hospital's board
of trustees and its medical staff by noting that "many courts have created an exception for corporate officers acting on their own behalf." Id. at 2741 n.15. See, e.g., Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor
Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1496 (3d Cir. 1985) ("If corporate officers or employees act for their own
interests, and outside the interests of the corporation, they are legally capable of conspiring with
their employees for purposes of section I.") (citing Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 813 n.43
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985); H & B Equipment Co. v. International
Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1978); Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector,
Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974)). Since the Court did not expressly reject such an approach, and because physicians are no doubt acting in their own economic interests even when
serving as medical staff members, the probability of proving concerted action by this method
Published
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hospital's medical staff and who are principally involved in the admitting privilege decision. 10 4 In fact, recent cases have utilized this latter
approach in holding that the members of a medical staff or a professional association can provide the requisite plurality of actors necessary
for a showing of concerted action.' 5 This trend of treating members of
medical staffs and professional associations as independent, competing
economic entities presents an attractive option for plaintiffs in proving
concert of action.1 6
More importantly, Supreme Court precedent justifies treating such
medical staffs and professional associations as, in economic reality, consisting of independent medical practitioners who are in competition
with each other. For example, in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society,' 7 the question before the Court was the legality of maximum
price-fixing agreements utilized by two independent medical foundations. There was no allegation that the foundations acted together in
restraint of trade; rather, the antitrust attack was directed individually
against each combination of physicians.' 0 8 Of importance is the fact
that the Court did not even address the concerted action issue in Maricopa,1 9 which indicates that the Court confirmed, albeit sub silentio,
that the doctors participating in each foundation had agreed among
themselves to fix prices. Moreover, in National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States," 0 the Court again failed to address the
concerted action issue, and simply "assumed" that the ethical canon of
the professional association satisfied the "contract, combination, or conspiracy" requirement because the engineers had agreed among themselves on the rule prohibiting competitive bidding."'

104. See infra notes 139-43 & 167-69 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 813 (3d Cir. 1984) (medical staff), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985); Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479,
1490 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (professional association).
106. The attractiveness of this option is that the plaintiff will not have to show a conspiracy,
and will simply have to demonstrate that members of the medical staff or professional association
combined together to reject the plaintiff's request for privileges or membership. Thus, this approach of proving concerted action overcomes the difficulties of showing the same through a conspiracy or agreement between the hospital's board of trustees and the medical staff in, for example, the hospital admitting privilege context. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
107. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
108. Id. at 335-36. The Court phrased the issue as "whether the Sherman Act prohibits the
competing doctors from adopting, revising, and agreeing to use a maximum-fee schedule in implementation of the insurance plans." Id. at 342.
109. See id. at 339-42.
110. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
Ill. See id. at 682-83. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), it can also
be argued that the Court found concerted action solely through the agreement between members
of the county bar association regarding a minimum-fee schedule. This is plausible because the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
Court did not find that a conspiracy existed between the county and state bars as there was no
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The precedential weight of Maricopa and NSPE is persuasive because the Court apparently did not even deem the concerted action
question to be at issue in condemning the price-fixing agreements of
both professional combinations. In fact, statements by the Court in its
decision in Associated Press v. United States1 2 are particularly enlightening in revealing the Supreme Court's position on this issue:
The Sherman Act was specifically intended to prohibit independent businesses from becoming "associates" in a common plan which is bound to
reduce their competitor's opportunity to buy or sell the things in which,
the groups compete. Victory of a member of such a combination over its
business rivals achieved by such collective means cannot consistently
with the Sherman Act or with practical, everyday knowledge be attributed to individual "enterprise and sagacity"; such hampering of business
rivals can only be attributed to that which really makes it possible-the
collective power of an unlawful combination. I s
The reasoning embodied in the above quotation definitely justifies the
Supreme Court's silence on the concerted action issue in such cases as
Maricopa and NSPE.11 4 Clearly the Court's position is that such combinations of competitors must be viewed realistically, with "practical,
everyday knowledge," to reach the undisputed conclusion that such associations are, in fact, unlawful combinations of otherwise independent
competitors. Thus, the economic reality is that members of medical
staffs as well as professional associations can be considered " 'associates' in a common plan" who are otherwise independent economic actors. Therefore, when such associates act together to further the objectives of their combination, this conduct is concerted and deserving of
careful antitrust scrutiny.
2.

The Interstate Commerce Test

It is well established that the Sherman Act does not apply to all
restraints of trade, and this is especially true when the challenged activity has no appreciable effect on interstate commerce and can be considered "purely" intrastate. In fact, that the interstate commerce test is
an obstacle to the plaintiff"' is solidly entrenched in Supreme Court
evidence that the state bar association took formal disciplinary action to enforce adherence to the
minimum-fee schedule. Id. at 777-78.
112. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
113. Id. at 15.
114. See also Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (concerted action
through collective action of Exchange and its members); American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs,
Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (applying agency principles to hold 90,000-member
engineering society liable for Sherman Act violation based on action of committee with delegated
authority).
Some courts 1985
view the interstate commerce requirement as both a procedural prerquiPublished 115.
by eCommons,

70

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11:1

precedent mandating that the challenged restraint "substantially and
adversely affects interstate commerce." 11' 6 Moreover, in the context of
antitrust claims brought against health care professionals, the commerce requirement has long been an obstacle to plaintiffs as courts
have viewed the distribution of medical services or matters affecting
17
those services as purely intrastate in character.'
In attempting to overcome the commerce barrier, plaintiffs essentially have two methods of satisfying the jurisdictional prong of the
Sherman Act. One method of meeting the interstate commerce test is
by showing that the activity in question is in interstate commerce."'
However, even if the activity is not "in commerce" in that it is an intrastate activity, the jurisdictional requirement can still be satisfied if
the challenged conduct substantially affects interstate commerce.'1 9 Because courts have traditionally viewed the activities of the medical profession as being intrastate in character, plaintiffs challenging the conduct of health care professionals have generally had to rely on the
second, more burdensome, method of demonstrating the requisite interstate commerce connection. Recently, however, the Supreme Court decided two cases that cast significant light onto this often nebulous requirement and seemingly make the plaintiff's burden much easier.
In Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital,2 0 the Supreme Court issued a major decision affecting subsequent antitrust
claims against health care professionals in holding that the provision of
hospital services, although a local or intrastate activity, can substantially affect interstate commerce.' 2 ' Importantly, the Court asserted
that in satisfying the interstate commerce test, the activity at issue did
not have to be "purposefully directed" at interstate commerce, and that
an indirect effect on interstate commerce is enough if it is a "substan-

site and part of the substantive offense under the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp.,
745 F.2d 786, 824 n.63 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that both requirements are met by same test), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985):
116. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974).
117. See, e.g., Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episcopal-Memorial Medical Center, 513 F.2d 684
(10th Cir. 1975). But see, e.g., Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir.
1981). See also supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
118. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 66, § 233, at 709.
119. Id. § 233, at 710. Professor Sullivan notes that there must be a causal connection
between the challenged activity and the flow of commerce. However, he also contends that it is not
the "quantitative substantiality" of the impact, but rather, "if a local activity has in a practical
sense a significant impact on competition in commerce, the Act applies to the local activity even
though the activity does not reduce the quantity of interstate commerce . . . . " Id. Professor
Sullivan cites as an example of such activity the legal services involved in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
120. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
121. Id. at 739-40.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
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tial effect." 1 2 Thus, this Supreme Court decision is important because
it reversed the trend of lower courts in viewing the provision of hospital
and medical services as purely intrastate in character.
Subsequent to Hospital Building Co., the Court issued another
pivotal decision further refining the interstate commerce test in McLain
v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc. 23 In McLain, the Court
effected a significant reformation of the interstate commerce test as a
threshold inquiry by shifting the focus to whether the defendant's questioned conduct could have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
instead of focusing on whether the challenged conduct did in fact have
a substantial effect on commerce. 124 This is a significant change in the
commerce inquiry because it now offers a plaintiff the opportunity to
argue potential effects on interstate commerce rather than the actual
effects at the date of suit. 126
Additionally, there is some broad language in McLain that will be
even more troublesome to potential antitrust defendants. Specifically,
language in the opinion indicates that the appropriate inquiry may be
the effect of the defendants' total activities on interstate commerce
rather than simply the commerce effect of the challenged conduct.1 26 It
is clear that this interpretation of the Court's opinion would significantly diminish the burden of the interstate commerce test. 2 7 In fact,

122. Id. at 744. In fact, the Court asserted that the "substantial effect" test would be met
even if the conspiracy in restraint of trade did not "threaten the demise of out-of-state businesses
or . . . affect market prices." Id. at 746.
123. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
124. Id. at 242-43.
125. In the Court's view, requiring a showing of an actual effect on interstate commerce
caused by the defendant's challenged conduct would diminish the breadth of the Sherman Act
because in a civil Sherman action, "liability may be established by proof of either an unlawful
purpose or an anticompetitive effect." Id. at 243. See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). Thus, requiring a showing of actual effect would defeat an
otherwise properly merited Sherman action where "the alleged restraint failed to have its intended
anticompetitive effect." McLain, 444 U.S. at 243. However, as a practical matter, it is highly
improbable that a private plaintiff would maintain a Sherman civil action unless the defendant's
practice had an actual effect on the challenger's business, because otherwise, the plaintiff would
have a difficult time attempting to prove damages.
126. This conclusion is tenable because the Court stated that it would only be necessary for
the plaintiff to show a substantial effect on commerce "generated by respondents' brokerage activity," and that the plaintiff need not make a "more particularized showing of an effect on interstate
commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy to fix commission rates, or by those other aspects of
respondents' activity that are alleged to be unlawful." McLain, 444 U.S. at 242-43. See also id.
at 246. See, e.g., Western Waste Serv. Sys. v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094, 1097 (9th
Cir.) (Interpreted McLain to mean "that it was not necessary for the alleged antitrust violation
complained of to have affected interstate commerce so long as defendants' business activities, independent of the violations, affected interstate commerce."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
127. Some commentators argue that such a reading of McLain would in essence eliminate
the interstate commerce test. They contend, however, that this "suggestive language" is simply
casual
or worse. 1985
Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 103, at 632-33. But see
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some lower federal courts have taken the McLain invitation and have
analyzed the defendant's total activities in determining whether they
substantially affect interstate commerce. 128
IV.

LOWER FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS ANALYZING GROUP
BOYCOTTS BY HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS

During 1983 and 1984, three significant decisions were rendered
by federal courts of appeals involving group boycotts by health care
professionals that are significant in defining the future direction of this
area of antitrust law. In each case, the courts were forced to resolve
difficult issues stemming from the Supreme Court precedents discussed
above. For instance, the courts dealt with issues involving concerted
action, the appropriate standard for analyzing the group boycott in
light of Goldfarb, NSPE and Maricopa, as well as the interstate commerce test. Furthermore, each case presents a different professional
practice that essentially covers the spectrum of trade restraints effectuated through group boycotts aimed at other health care practitioners.
The cases to be analyzed herein include the denial of hospital admitting privileges to qualified osteopathic physicians, 12 9 the denial of professional association membership status to evidently qualified dentists,"' 0 and group boycotts against chiropractors by professional health
13 1
care associations.
In Weiss v. York Hospital,132 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit was faced with a class action brought by an osteopathic physician against York Hospital and its medical staff alleging that the defendants' refusal to grant him hospital admitting privileges constituted
a per se illegal group boycott under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 3 3

Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 382 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Federal courts have relied upon
the treatment of out-of-state patients, the receipt of Medicare, Medicaid, and out-of-state insurance funds, and the purchase of medicine, equipment, and medical supplies from out-of-state purveyors by the plaintiff doctor and/or the defendant hospital, to rule that the doctor's complaint
satisfies the jurisdictional requirement of interstate commerce under the Sherman Act.") (citing
cases), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3501 (1985).
128. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 824-25, 825 n.66 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing
Cardio-Medical Assocs., Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 721 F.2d 68, 74-75 (3d. Cir.
1983)), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985).
129. Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1777
(1985). See infra notes 132-59 and accompanying text.
130. Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
See infra notes 160-80 and accompanying text.
131. Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n., 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 2398 (1984). See infra notes 181-97 and accompanying text.
132. 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985).
133. Id. at 792, 818. The defendants in this action consisted of York Hospital, the York
Medical and Dental Staff, and 10 individual physicians who served on medical staff review committees. Id. at 791. Besides the § I claim, the plaintiff also brought a claim under § 2 of the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
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The gist of the physician's complaint was that the defendants applied
"strict scrutiny" to applications by osteopaths (D.O.'s) for
admitting
privileges as compared to the review given applications by allopaths
(M.D.'s). 5 Furthermore, the plaintiff asserted that even when the defendants granted admitting privileges to D.O.'s, these physicians were
given "assistant staff" privileges, the lowest possible classification. 135
Finally, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants' action in applying
"strict scrutiny" to applications by D.O.'s for admitting privileges
affected class members who had not applied for privileges by "sending a
message" to osteopaths in the York Hospital area that the defendants
discriminated against D.O.'s.' 3
In reviewing this case, the Weiss court initially had difficulty
resolving the concerted action issue because the plaintiff contended that
the medical staff and York Hospital were distinct entities capable of
reaching an agreement or conspiracy.137 The court finally rejected the
plaintiff's contention, simply relying on the district court holding that
the medical staff was an "unincorporated division" of the hospital and,
therefore, each was considered a single entity incapable of acting in
concert under the Sherman Act.1 38 Dr. Weiss, however, also alleged
that the "doctors who joined together to form the medical staff were
separate economic entities who competed against each other so . .. the

Sherman Act alleging that the hospital had engaged in monopolization. The ultimate holdings of
the court were that only the medical staff had violated § I of the Sherman Act, and that the
hospital did not violate § 2 because of the lack of any monopolizing conduct. See id. at 831. On
ultimate remand, the case was favorably settled for the plaintiff, Dr. Weiss, who, according to the
terms of the settlement, was finally granted admitting privileges. See Weiss v. York Hosp., 590 F.
Supp. 283 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
134. Weiss, 745 F.2d at 794-95. The plaintiff alleged that the medical staff effectuated its
policy of discrimination against D.O.'s by essentially granting admitting privileges to any M.D.
who applied, but in the case of D.O.'s, the medical staff analyzed, in a very deiailed manner, the
applications submitted by D.O.'s. In fact, one of the criteria considered was the applicant's "social
acceptability." Id. at 795. Thus, "strict scrutiny" was applied to the applications of osteopathic
physicians. See id. The plaintiff had applied for admitting privileges on three occasions but each
of his applications was denied, allegedly because of his personality. During the pendency of the
litigation, the defendants ironically granted admitting privileges to five D.O.'s. See id. at 797-99.
For a discussion of the process by which admitting privileges are granted, and the control exerted
over this process by the medical staff, see Dolan & Ralston, supra note !1,at 709-12.
135. Weiss, 745 F.2d at 796. Granting a physician the lowest possible classification of admitting privileges is a classic example of conferring "second-class practitioner" status. See supra
text accompanying note 14. It is noteworthy that until 1974, the hospital's corporate charter
banned D.O.'s from obtaining admitting privileges. Weiss, 745 F.2d at 794. Apparently under
threat of legal action by Weiss, the medical staff amended its bylaws in 1976 to permit osteopaths
to become members of the medical staff. See id. at 795.
136. Weiss, 745 F.2d at 792.
137. Id. at 813.
138.eCommons,
Id. at 814-15.
But see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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medical staff was a 'combination' within the meaning of section 1""'
In resolving this contention, the court relied upon the principle that
antitrust policy requires courts to focus on the "economic substance of
the arrangement, not merely its forhn."' ° The court then decided that
the "economic substance" of this arrangement was that each member
of the medical staff was, in essence, a separate economic entity because
the doctors were actually in competition with each other in the York
medical community. 4 The court therefore held, as a matter of law,
that the medical staff was a combination of individual doctors whose
conduct satisfied the concerted action requirement of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.1 42 Thus, the plaintiff's case was saved by the court's economically prudent realization that a hospital's medical staff cannot realistically be considered a single entity for purposes of antitrust

scrutiny.

43

The next pertinent issue addressed by the Weiss court was the
plaintiff's allegation that the medical staff's use of "strict scrutiny" in
reviewing applications by D.O.'s for admitting privileges constituted a
per se illegal group boycott.144 In analyzing this contention the court
considered the challenged conduct to be akin to a "classic," two-level
boycott.146 Thus, in the court's view, even though the boycott was not
entirely effective in excluding all osteopathic physicians from York
Hospital's medical staff, the discriminatory treatment was sufficient

139. Weiss, 745 F.2d at 813.
140. Id. at 815.
141. Id. at 816.
142. Id. at 814. There is no doubt, considering previous Supreme Court decisions, that the
court reached the correct conclusion on the concerted action issue. See supra notes 107-14 and
accompanying text.
143. The court did, however, reach a questionable conclusion in holding that the hospital
could not conspire with its medical staff. See supra note 103. Nevertheless, because the court
considered that the medical staff was composed of independent doctors, but yet was classified as
an unincorporated division of the hospital, it is apparent that the court must have, in actuality,
considered the medical staff as existing apart from the hospital. Thus, in essence, the conclusion
reached by the court is that which it initially denied-the hospital and medical staff were separate
economic entities, even if not recognized as such under the Sherman Act. See Weiss, 745 F.2d at
813-15.
144. Weiss, 745 F.2d at 818.
145. Id. at 819. In analogizing the practice in question to that of a "classic" boycott the
court stated:
In this case York is a provider of hospital services; for the purpose of our analysis, the
equivalent of the manufacturer in the example of a classical boycott. Similarly, the M.D.s
are the equivalent of the retailers in the example, in the sense that physicians [ie., D.O.s]
require access to a hospital in order to effectively treat patients.
Id. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70. The Weiss court did note that in the traditional
"classic" boycott, the retailers pressure or coerce the manufacturer not to deal with the boycotted
retailers; however, the court asserted that in this case no coercion was necessary because of the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
control exerted by M.D.'s over the admitting privilege decision. 745 F.2d at 819.
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enough for the court to consider the medical staff's practice as analogous to the traditionally-condemned group boycott.' 4 Furthermore, the
Third Circuit was cognizant of Supreme Court precedents condemning
such group boycotts as per se illegal." 7
Nevertheless, the Weiss court was compelled to consider the
ramifications of the Goldfarb footnote, as developed in NSPE and
Maricopa.1 8 According to the Third Circuit, the thrust of these Supreme Court cases, which indicate that the learned professions may receive different antitrust treatment than that accorded other business
entities, 4 9 is that professional conduct normally considered per se illegal will instead be analyzed under the rule-of-reason when the alleged
restraint of trade is premised upon an "ethical norm" of'a profession.150
Thus, as the court conceded, in most cases involving denials of hospital
admitting privileges, the "courts will, more or less openly, have to utilize a rule of reason balancing approach."' '5
In this particular case, however, the Weiss court held that the defendants' conduct was a per se illegal group boycott because no justification was offered by the defendants to the effect that their discriminatory treatment of osteopaths was premised on "public service or ethical
norms."' 52 In fact, as the court noted, it would have been difficult if not
impossible for the defendants to have contended that D.O.'s, as compared to M.D.'s, lacked the necessary professional competence to be
granted admitting privileges.' 53
After defining the breadth of differential antitrust treatment to be
afforded defendants in denial of admitting privilege cases, the Weiss
court then proceeded to provide guidance to the district court in applying the rule-of-reason in the context of the instant case. According to
the Third Circuit, a medical staff could legitimately engage in self-reg-

146. Weiss, 745 F.2d at 820.
147. Id. at 818. For an analysis of the Supreme Court's group boycott precedents, see supra
notes 71-98 and accompanying text.
148. Weiss, 745 F.2d at 820.
149. For analysis of the Goldfarb differential treatment dichotomy, see supra notes 30-64
and accompanying text.
150. Weiss, 745 F.2d at 820, 820 n.60. The court concluded that the medical staff had the
right to exclude any doctor based on his or her lack of "professional competence or unprofessional
conduct" because this could be viewed as a legitimate form of "industry" self-regulation. Id. at
820.
151. Id. at 820.
152. Id. at 820-21.
153. Id. at 820, 792 n.4. See supra notes 19 & 23 and accompanying text. It is noteworthy
that the Weiss court directed the district court, on remand for the damage phase of the trial, to
allow the defendants to raise the "defense" that any application for privileges by an osteopath,
including Weiss', was "properly refused because of the doctor's lack of professional competence or
Published
by eCommons,
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ulation and thus deny admitting privileges to applicants if the denial
1
was grounded on competency or professional conduct considerations. 5
The Weiss court asserted that a denial of admitting privileges based on
such considerations was justifiable as a component of the medical
staff's and hospital's "public service" function; moreover, in antitrust
terminology, the court was of the opinion that an exclusion of a physician based on a lack of competence or professional ability would be
pro-competitive. 155 Thus, increasing the reputation and quality of medical services at the hospital would enhance efficiency and further, rather
than diminish, competition. 156
As a final issue, the Weiss court had to resolve the defendants'
argument that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the interstate commerce
test. In this regard, the defendants presented an innovative argument
advocating an unjustifiably restrictive view of the commerce test in that
the court should focus on how the defendants' challenged conduct affected the plaintiffs activities in interstate commerce.1 57 The court rejected this contention, however, asserting that the proper focus is on
how the defendants' conduct affects interstate commerce.' 1s Furthermore, the Weiss court went a step further, stating that it would examine the defendants' entire activities in interstate commerce and not
1 59
just the conduct at issue.
In a case presenting similar issues to those decided by the Third
Circuit in Weiss, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
recently faced a distinct type of trade restraint effectuated by a professional association in Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology.'6 ° At issue in Kreuzer was the requirement of the American Academy of Periodontology (AAP)16 that a practitioner limit his

154. See Weiss, 745 F.2d at 820 n.60.
155. Id. Of course, such exclusions would be pro-competitive only if the same standards
were applied to all privilege applicants. Id. The court also asserted that excluding a physician
.because of unprofessional conduct, such as a "history of trouble in interpersonal relations," would
also be legitimate and pro-competitive. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 824.
158. Id. at 824-25.
159. See id. at 824-25, 825 n.66. For an analysis of the Supreme Court's most recent case
specifically analyzing the interstate commerce requirement, see supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
160. 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
161. The AAP is a nonprofit corporation organized to advance the science of periodontology, which entails the "formation of standards for advancing training and formulation of
procedures to facilitate reimbursement of practitioners by third-party payment plans." Id. at
1483. "Periodontics" is one of the eight dental specialties and is concerned with "the treatment of
diseases of the tissues surrounding the teeth." Id. at 1482. To practice periodontics, the practitioner need only be a graduate of an approved dental school and a licensed dentist. Id. The Amerihttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
can Dental Association (ADA) engages in numerous self-regulatory activities including the recog-
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or her dental practice to periodontics in order to be eligible for "active
membership" in the professional association. The plaintiff, a licensed
dentist who practiced periodontics, asserted that the AAP's "limited
practice requirement" was the means for effectuating a group boycott
by AAP members against others in this dental specialty who did not
specifically limit their practice to periodontics.16 2 Specifically, Dr.
Kreuzer alleged that denying him active membership in the AAP simply because he practiced "periodontal prosthesis"1 63 along with periodontics constituted a per se illegal group boycott. 164
In attempting to show concerted action, the plaintiff contended
that the AAP conspired with the American Dental Association (ADA)
to effectuate a group boycott against periodontists who also practiced
periodontal prosthesis by not including the latter practice within' the
recognized dental specialty of periodontics. 6 5 The Kreuzer court, however, failed to find such a conspiracy between the AAP and the
ADA. 6 6 Nevertheless, the plaintiff was able to establish concerted action under a different and now-familiar method. 67 Specifically, Dr.
Kreuzer argued that the individual members of the AAP conspired to
enforce the limited practice requirement and to deny his membership
application.16 8 The court overwhelmingly accepted this theory of con-

nition of specialty organizations such as the AAP. Id. at 1483.
162. Id. at 1482. The AAP's "limited practice requirement" provides that a "dentist must
be educationally qualified in the specialty of periodontics according to the ADA, and 'must limit
• . . his practice exclusively to the special areas approved by the American Dental Association.'" Id. at 1483 (quoting ADA PRINCIPLE OF ETHICS § 18, RE 155) (emphasis by court).
When a periodontist fails to meet the AAP's "limited practice requirement," he or she is ineligible
for "active membership" in the AAP and can only be granted "associate membership." Id at
1483. Associate members do not have the right to vote, make nominations, or hold office in the
AAP. Id. at 1483 n.7. Moreover, associate members are listed in a different manner in the AAP's'
membership directory than are active members. Id. Thus, in essence, the grant of associate membership is an example of conferring "second-class practitioner" status. See supra text accompanying note 14.
163. "Periodontal prosthesis" is a subfield of periodontology that is concerned with "saving
teeth that might otherwise be extracted due to advanced periodontal disease." Kreuzer, 735 F.2d
at 1483. The ADA does not recognize periodontal prosthesis as a dental specialty; therefore, if a
'dentist practices periodontal prosthesis along with periodontology, he or she does not meet the
AAP's "limited practice requirement." See supra note 162.
164. Kreuzer, 735 F.2d at 1491.
165. Id. at 1485.
166. Id. at 1488. The court, demonstrating the difficulty of proving a Sherman Act conspiracy, stated that a "showing of regular contact between two independent professional associations
on general matters of mutual interest and concern" is insufficient to.provide an inference of conspiracy, and that such an inference can only be drawn when there is a showing that the "alleged
conspirator has acted contrary to his own independent interest." Id. Because the plaintiff failed to
satisfy this burden, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the ADA. Id. at 1490.
167. See supra notes 103-14 and accompanying text.
Kreuzer, 735 1985
F.2d at 1490.
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certed action, asserting that there could "be no doubt that a conspiracy
existed within the AAP to deny Dr. Kreuzer's application for active
membership."'' 69 Thus, as demonstrated in the instant case as well as in
the Third Circuit's decision in Weiss, antitrust plaintiffs are readily
satisfying the concerted action requirement of section 1 of the Sherman
Act by simply focusing on the economic reality that professional associations and medical staffs consist of individual, competing economic
entities.
The important part of the Kreuzer court's opinion is its analysis of
whether the alleged per se illegal group boycott effectuated by the
AAP should be viewed differently under the Sherman Act because
health care professionals were involved. Interestingly, the court decided
to apply the rule-of-reason to the AAP's actions in enforcing the limited practice requirement because of the "public service" concerns allegedly underlying the professional association's admission requirements.170 In reaching this conclusion, however, the court attempted to
reconcile the conflict between Supreme Court precedents holding group
a
boycotts per se illegal and the Goldfarb footnote dichotomy offering
171 Ulbasis for different antitrust treatment of the learned professions.
timately, the court ostensibly decided that Supreme Court precedents
condemning all group boycotts were not conclusive, and that in the context of antitrust challenges to the conduct of the learned professions,
there were too many uncertainties regarding the competitive effects of
the practices involved to condemn them automatically under traditional
172
per se rules.
In holding that the district court was correct in utilizing the ruleof-reason to analyze the professional group boycott at issue, the Kreuzer court then proceeded to provide the lower court with guidance in
making this analysis. Specifically, the court of appeals rejected the district court's reliance on the lack of any anticompetitive intent as its sole
basis for finding that the AAP's limited practice requirement passed

169. Id.
170. Id. at 1492. No doubt the court was influenced by the United States' amicus curiae
brief urging rule-of-reason analysis because a "professional organization is the group best suited to
judge the competence of its members to hold themselves out to the public as specialists." Id. at
1491 (citing Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States at 5-6). Moreover, the United States
urged that membership rules "inform the public and serve a pro-competitive function." Id.
171. See id. at 1490-92.
172. Id. at 1491-92. The Kreuzer court interpreted Supreme Court precedents condemning
group boycotts as per se illegal as only applicable when there was a "purpose to exclude competitors." Id. at 1492. Moreover, the court asserted that there was no such purpose in the instant case
because the "AAP is a membership organization enforcing its membership rules," and such
"membership organizations do not actually compete with the individual member who is affected
." Id. For an analysis of the logical correctness of the Kreuzer
by a questioned practice ...
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
court's approach, see infra text accompanying notes 205-07.
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muster under the rule-of-reason. 173 The Kreuzer court explained that
under long-standing precedent, such as the Supreme Court's decision in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 7 4 the "'inquiry mandated
by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that
promotes competition or one that suppresses competition.' 175 In this
regard, the court noted that the conduct under question had a number
of possible anticompetitive effects, 76 but conversely, the AAP's limited
practice requirement could have pro-competitive effects by improving
1
"the quality of care of periodontal patients. 7
In prescribing the appropriate balancing approach to be utilized
under the rule-of-reason, the Kreuzer court articulated a standard
which inquired into the nexus between the questioned membership rule
and its public service or patient care rationale. 178 This standard focused
on whether the economic self-interest of the health care practitioners
predominated the membership practice in question, or whether there
was a completely separate patient care justification promoted by the
rule. Thus, implicit in the court's standard is a requirement that a
court inquire into the intent, purpose, or motivation behind an asserted
"public service or ethical norm" rationale to determine whether it genuinely promotes the quality of patient care or is simply a pretextual
justification that, in actuality, promotes the economic interests of the
members of the professional association. Of course, if the justification
offered by the professional association was simply the economic selfinterest of its members, the challenged conduct would fail to pass muster under the rule-of-reason.

173. Kreuzer, 735 F.2d at 1492-93, 1493 n.20.
174. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
175. Kreuzer, 735 F.2d at 1492 (quoting National Soc'y Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978)).
176. Kreuzer, 735 F.2d at 1493-94. The court noted that the limited practice requirement
could prevent periodontists from competing with general dentists; that it could prevent periodontists from actively competing with others in this specialty area if a periodontist decided to forego
active membership; and finally, that consumers could be injured because periodontists without
active membership would not receive referrals and thus the supply of such practitioners would be
artificially limited, thereby increasing prices. Id.
177. Id. at 1494. Specifically, the AAP contended that by requiring periodontists to fully
devote their practice to this specialty, their expertise would be enhanced, thereby increasing the
quality of patient care. Id.
178. Id. at 1494. The court's standard for applying a rule-of-reason analysis in the context
of a professional group boycott was as follows: "When the economic self-interest of the boycotting
group and its proffered justifications merge the rule of reason will seldom be satisfied. When,
however, the justification for the boycott is closely related to a lawful purpose the rule of reason
will generally be satisfied." Id. Note, however, that the court did not define what was a "lawful
purpose." It is asserted that bona fide "public service and ethical norms" justifications proffered
by boycotting professionals constitute a lawful purpose and are pro-competitive in effect. See infra
text by
accompanying
notes
242-57.
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Nevertheless, in articulating a seemingly workable standard for
analyzing group boycotts by professional associations, the Kreuzer
court introduced uncertainty into its test by including one final element. Specifically, the court asserted that even if the professional association establishes that its practice is pro-competitive in that it improves the quality of patient care, the defendant must still demonstrate
that "the means chosen to achieve that end are the least restrictive
available." 17 9 Thus, in relieving the professional association and its
"limited practice requirement" from immediate condemnation under
the per se rule against group boycotts, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia clearly decided not to analyze the defendant's
conduct under the traditional rule-of-reason and instead adopted an intermediate standard employing a least restrictive means analysis.18
On the basis of the Weiss and Kreuzer decisions, it is apparent
that at least two federal courts of appeals have held that rule-of-reason
analysis, at least in some form, is the appropriate standard of antitrust
review for evaluating the difficult area of group boycotts by health care
professionals when the conduct is premised on "public service or ethical
norms" justifications. Additionally, it is clear that the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit will also analyze professional group boycotts
under the rule-of-reason after the Seventh Circuit's decision in Wilk v.
American Medical Association. 81
In Wilk, the court was faced with an interesting factual situation
where the plaintiffs, five licensed chiropractors,' 8 2 alleged that the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to eliminate the chiropractic profession through the use of a group boycott.' 3 Principal among the
plaintiffs' contentions was that the defendant American Medical Association (AMA), through its self-regulatory ethical principles and vari-

179. Kreuzer, 735 F.2d at 1495.
180. For an analysis of the correctness of the Kreuzer court's approach, see infra text accompanying notes 228-41. For a discussion of a proposed rule-of-reason test for analyzing group
boycotts by health care professionals, see infra text accompanying notes 242-56.
181. 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2398 (1984).
182. "Chiropractic" is a health care service which has, as its primary therapeutic tool, spinal manipulation. Id. at 213. Such therapy is also practiced by osteopathic physicians, physical
therapists, and some allopathic physicians. Id. at 213 n.4. Thus, chiropractors are state-licensed
practitioners who compete with physicians in a narrow area of health care services. Id. at 216,
218.
183. Id. at 211. The defendants who allegedly participated in the conspiracy against chiropractors included, inter alia, the American Medical Association (AMA), the American Hospital
Association (AHA), the American College of Surgeons (ACS), the American College of Physicians (ACP), the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH), the American College
of Radiology, the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, and the Illinois State Medical
Society (ISMS). See id. at 211-13. The court ultimately held, as the jury found, that the AMA,
AHA, ACS, ACP, JCAH, and the ISMS did in fact participate in a conspiracy against the chiropractic profession. Id. at 233.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
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ous related resolutions, had condemned chiropractors as "quacks" and
an "unscientific cult" that did not practice a method of healing with a
scientific basis.""' Furthermore, the plaintiffs asserted that in carrying
out this campaign against the, chiropractic profession, the AMA communicated to numerous medical associations, medical schools, and hospitals that associations between physicians and chiropractors were "unethical."'' 1 5 The plaintiffs asserted that as a result of this conspiracy
physicians refused to deal with them, that chiropractors were denied
clinical admitting privileges at numerous hospitals, that their referral
business declined, and ultimately that public demand for chiropractic
services was negatively affected. 18 Therefore, the chiropractors argued
that the conduct of the defendants constituted a per se illegal group
boycott, and as such, it was irrelevant whether the defendants' conduct
was motivated by a belief in the dangers of chiropractic.18 7
In considering this group boycott contention, the Wilk court engaged in the now-familiar task of attempting to balance Supreme
Court precedents condemning group boycotts as per se illegal against
the differential treatment footnote dichotomy of Goldfarb as "interpreted" in NSPE and Maricopa. While the Wilk court was cognizant
of the fact that the Supreme Court was persistent in its support of the
per se antitrust doctrine, the Seventh Circuit asserted, nevertheless,
that "boycotts are illegal per se only if used to enforce agreements that
are themselves illegal per se-for example price-fixing agreements.' 8
Moreover, after quickly addressing the group boycott precedent issue,
the Wilk court was easily convinced that this case was inappropriate

184. Id. at 213. For evidence that this conduct is not innovative on the AMA's part, and
that this organization had similarly condemned osteopathic physicians before "deciding to join
them," see Blackstone, supra note 4, at 405, 412, 417.
185. Wilk, 719 F.2d at 213-14.
186. Id. at 214.
187. Id. at 216. Nonetheless, the district court ultimately admitted the defendants' public
interest evidence, and as the appellate court described, "virtually all of the parties' arguments to
the jury were a free-for-all between chiropractors and medical doctors, in which the scientific
legitimacy of chiropractic was hotly debated and the comparative intensity of the avarice of the
adversaries was explored." Id. at 216.
188. Wilk, 719 F.2d at 221 (quoting Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488, 1495 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985)). What is interesting in the Seventh Circuit's group boycott analysis is that the court failed to analyze or even cite specific Supreme Court cases condemning group boycotts as per se illegal. See id. at 221. For a discussion of the Court's group boycott
precedent, see supra notes 71-98 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit has consistently
overlooked the weight of Supreme Court authority in its group boycott analysis. See, e.g., Phil
Tolkan Datsun, Inc. v. Greater Milwaukee Datsun Dealers' Advertising Ass'n, Inc., 672 F.2d
1280, 1281 (7th Cir. 1982) (group boycotts must affect consumers rather than just competitors to
be per se illegal). For an analysis of the correctness of the Seventh Circuit's group boycott "plus"
approach,
see infra text1985
accompanying notes 200-04.
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for per se treatment because of the uncertainties in evaluating practices
of professionals, and because there was substantial evidence of a "patient care" motive as asserted by the defendants. 181 In sum, the Seventh Circuit viewed cases such as Maricopa and NSPE as preserving
the opportunity for different antitrust treatment of the conduct of professionals, and believed that the instant case was an appropriate one for
exercising that "discretion" because the ethical justifications proffered
by the defendants gave rise "to questions of sufficient delicacy and novelty at least to escape per se treatment. "190
The Wilk court then proceeded to provide the district court with
guidance for applying the rule-of-reason in this difficult case because it
found that defective jury instructions were given.1 91 In providing this
guidance, however, the Wilk court decided that the rule-of-reason
could be "modified" in the instant case because the defendants
presented "public service and ethical norms" justifications for their
conduct.1 92 Thus, because of the "patient care" rationales presented by
the defendants for the group boycott in question, the court asserted
that "[a] value independent of the values attributed to unrestrained
competition must enter the equation."1 9 3
In deciding to allow a value independent of unrestrained competition to enter its "modified" rule-of-reason analysis, the Wilk court was
seemingly mindful of the fact that the Supreme Court had consistently
excluded from the rule-of-reason equation variables unrelated to competition.1 94 Nevertheless, the "modified" rule-of-reason analysis articulated by the Wilk court, while requiring the defendant -to justify its
anticompetitive conduct when premised on "public service and ethical
norms" rationales, fails to require the defendant to prove that its conduct is pro-competitive in effect.1 9 5 This is because the Wilk court's

189. Wilk, 719 F.2d at 221.
190. Id. at 222.
191. Id. at 223. The court found the jury instructions invalid because of the district court's
failure to convey the single rule-of-reason inquiry of whether the questioned practice promotes or
suppresses competition. Id.
192. See id. at 225-26. In striking such a path, the court placed reliance on Justice Blackmun's concurrence in NSPE. See supra note 47. In fact, the Seventh Circuit made its position
very clear in stating:
It seems reasonable that two or three medical doctors, sharing [the] view [that associating
with chiropractors is unethical] and working as a team in the care of a particular patient,
would be free to agree, and to act on the agreement, to decline to associate with a particular chiropractor in the care of that patient.
Wilk, 719 F.2d at 226.
193. Wilk, 719 F.2d at 227.
194. See id. at 227-28.
195. Id. at 227. The court's standard is as follows:
The burden of persuasion is on the plaintiffs to show that the effect of Principle 3 [the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
AMA's anti-chiropractic provision] and the implementing conduct has been to restrict
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standard allows the defendant to escape Sherman Act liability by
showing that it had a specific, genuine, and reasonable patient care motive that was the "dominant" reason for the defendant's challenged activity. Thus, under this standard, if the defendant's patient care motive
is the dominating justification for the conduct at issue, the group boycott is presumed pro-competitive so long as the measure utilized by the
defendant is less restrictive of competition than are other available
methods. 9
The standard employed by the Wilk court does not place enough
emphasis on the competitive considerations mandated by the Supreme
Court in rule-of-reason inquiries and will ultimately, therefore, prove to
be unworkable.1 97 In deciding to remove the conduct of the AMA from
immediate condemnation under the per se rule against group boycotts,
it is clear that the Wilk court utilized a standard that lies somewhere
between rule-of-reason and per se methods of antitrust analysis. Although it is argued in this comment that a rule-of-reason analysis is the
correct approach for evaluating group boycotts by health care professionals, the questions presented when analyzing the rule-of-reason standards employed by the Wilk and Kreuzer courts are whether enough
emphasis is being placed on the competitive considerations mandated
by Supreme Court precedents, and whether the Seventh and District of
Columbia Circuits are justified in imposing a least restrictive means
burden on defendant health care professionals.
V.

ANALYSIS

A. The Lower Federal Court Shift to Rule-of-Reason Analysis: Does
the End Justify the Means?
In each of the decisions analyzed in part IV, the federal courts of

competition rather than to promote it. If the'plaintiffs have met this burden, the burden of
persuasion is on the defendants to show: (1) that they genuinely entertained a concern for
what they perceive as scientific method in the care of each person with whom they have
entered into a doctor-patient relationship; (2) that this concern is objectively reasonable;
(3) that this concern has been the dominant motivating factor in the defendants' promulgation of Principle 3 and in the conduct intended to implement it; and (4) that this concern
for scientific method in patient care could not have been adequately satisfied in a manner
less restrictive of competition.
Id. Even though the court was placing evidentiary burdens on the respective parties, it held that
the defendants' burden did not constitute an affirmative defense which had to be plead; nevertheless, if the defendants met this burden, they would escape § I Sherman Act liability as their
conduct would be deemed reasonable. Id. The court also asserted that the defendants had to have
a specific patient care motive--that is, the concern had to be for a specific patient and not simply
for the health, safety, and welfare of the general public. Id. at 228. See supra note 192.
196. See Wilk, 719 F.2d at 227. See also supra note 195.
197. For a discussion of these competitive considerations and the shortcomings of the Wilk
standard, see infra text accompanying notes 222-28.
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appeals all reached the conclusion that a rule-of-reason balancing approach should govern resolution of the difficult antitrust issue of group
boycotts by health care professionals when the conduct is premised on
"public service or ethical norms" justifications. 9 8 In avoiding the per se
rule which automatically condemns group boycotts, it is asserted that
the courts reached the correct result, considering the necessity of allowing the health care profession to regulate the competence and professional conduct of its members.1 9 9 In deciding to give defendant
health care professionals the benefit of the rule-of-reason in certain circumstances, however, it is apparent that the Courts of Appeals for the
Third, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have attempted to
diminish Supreme Court precedents condemning group boycotts as per
se illegal.
For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Wilk
clearly subordinated Supreme Court group boycott precedent in deciding to apply some form of the rule-of-reason to evaluate the boycott
against chiropractors. The Seventh Circuit's position, that group boycotts are only per se illegal when combined with another practice that
is in itself illegal under the antitrust laws,200 is simply untenable if that
court is proceeding under the premise that deference to Supreme Court
precedent construing the Sherman Act is necessary-a premise upon
which this comment proceeds. In its very recent decision in Jefferson
0
Parish,"
' the Court confirmed that group boycotts, including those effectuated by an association of competitors, are independent per se violations under section 1 of the Sherman Act.20 2 Moreover, the Seventh
Circuit's stance that group boycotts must injure consumers and not just
competitors in order to be per se illegal2 03 is, again, not supported by

198. The D.C. Circuit in Kreuzer and the Seventh Circuit in Wilk applied some form of the
rule-of-reason. See Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1492 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 217, 221-22 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 2398 (1984). The Third Circuit in Weiss indicated it would have applied the rule-ofreason had the defendants presented "public service or ethical norms" justifications for their conduct. See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 820-22 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1777 (1985).
199. For a discussion of why rule-of-reason analysis should govern antitrust review of group
boycotts by health care professionals, see infra text accompanying notes 257-63.
200. Wilk, 719 F.2d at 221. See supra text accompanying note 188.
201. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
202. Specifically, in asserting that certain types of commercial practices are deemed unreasonable as a matter of law, the Court noted: " "[W]here a complaint charges that the defendants
have engaged in price fixing, or have concertedly refused to deal with non-members of an association, . . . the amount of commerce involved is immaterial because such restraints are illegal per
se.' " Id. at 1556 n.10 (quoting United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522-23
(1948)) (emphasis added).
203. See e.g., Phil Tolkan Datsun, Inc. v. Greater Milwaukee Datsun Dealers' Advertising
Ass'n, Inc., 672 F.2d 1280. 1281 (7th Cir. 1982). See also supra note 188 and accompanying text.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
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the Supreme Court's decisions. In its General Motors decision, the
Court confirmed, that under prior precedent, a group boycott is per se
illegal if it results in the elimination of only a single competitor. 0 4
Thus, the Court's position demonstrates a realization that a boycott of
even one competitor will ultimately affect some consumers; however,
the Court has never articulated a requirement that the boycott actually
injure consumers before it can be condemned as per se illegal. It is
apparent that the Seventh Circuit in Wilk avoided analysis of Supreme
Court precedent condemning group boycotts as per se illegal because
such an analysis would have been fruitless as it would not have been
supportive of the Wilk court's position. The Seventh Circuit has simply
made a convincing case that it is articulating and applying its own
form of group boycott analysis-not that of the Supreme Court.
Similarly, the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Kreuzer is also flawed in attempting to distinguish Supreme Court precedents. The Kreuzer court's position is that group
boycotts are only per se illegal when they are designed to drive competitors out of the market.10 6 It is conceded that the Supreme Court cases
condemning group boycotts as per se illegal involved restraints of trade
that likely had as their goal the elimination of competitors. Nevertheless, the Kreuzer court's logic in concluding that the AAP's "limited
practice requirement" could have no such purpose or effect is clearly
defective. This is because the court concluded that concerted action
was proven in the case based on a conspiracy among the members of
the AAP to deny the plaintiff's application for full membership in this
professional association. However, in holding that the AAP's membership requirement could not have been designed to eliminate competitors, the court stated: "Because sanctioning or membership organizations do not actually compete with the individual member who is
affected by a questioned practice, per se treatment is inadvisable."20 6
The inconsistency of the Kreuzer court in avoiding the per se rule
against group boycotts is readily apparent: The individuals who make
up the professional association do, in fact, compete with the professional who seeks membership status. Why else would the court hold
that an agreement among members of the AAP satisfied the concerted

204.

United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145-46 (1966). See supra note

82.
205. Kreuzer, 735 F.2d. 1491-92. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
206. Kreuzer, 735 F.2d at 1492. But see Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 394 (7th
Cir. 1984) ("[Tihe members of a peer review committee, as trained experts in highly specialized
fields of medicine, are often in direct competition with the practitioner whom they are reviewing,
and the committee's decision to revoke hospital staff privileges may conceivably have a 'substantial and
effect' upon
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action requirement? The economic reality is that the professionals who
were members of the AAP did have competitive interests at stake and
could very well have adopted a membership requirement designed to
hamper or eliminate competitors. Moreover, later in its opinion, the
Kreuzer court even recognized a number of anticompetitive effects that
members of the AAP could accomplish through utilization of their
"limited practice requirement,' 20 7 thus adding to the hypocrisy of the
District of Columbia Circuit's position.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Weiss also demonstrated an inclination to diminish Supreme Court precedents condemning group boycotts as per se illegal. Although the court paid deference
to Supreme Court precedents in holding that the conduct of York Hospital's medical staff in applying "strict scrutiny" to applications by osteopaths for admitting privileges constituted a per se illegal group boycott, 20 the Weiss court also indicated that it would avoid the per se
rule in certain circumstances. An instance where the court stated it
would "have" to apply the rule-of-reason was where the conduct of the
health care professionals resembled industry self-regulation-that is,
where a health care professional was denied admitting privileges because of a "lack of professional competence or unprofessional conduct. ' 20 9 This approach is justifiable and does have public policy appeal. However, the Third Circuit's position finds no support whatsoever
in Supreme Court group boycott precedent. The Court has simply
never made an exception to the per se rule condemning commercial
group boycotts; furthermore, the Court has shown no inclination to apply a different rule simply because the conduct was justified as selfregulatory.21 0 Rather, in both its Silver and Associated Press decisions,
the Supreme Court indicated its unwillingness to allow relief from the

207. Kreuzer, 735 F.2d at 1493. In general, the potential anticompetitive effects with which
the court was concerned were based on the economic reality that AAP members have a competitive interest at stake in preventing potential members from having a broader dental practice than
those members who limited their practices solely to periodontics. Id. See supra notes 28 & 176.
208. Weiss, 745 F.2d at 820-21.
209. Id. at 820.
210. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (group boycott by
Exchange and its members would have been per se illegal but for duty of self-regulation imposed
on Exchange by Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light &
Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (Court rejected as per se illegal a group boycott by gas companies
and their regulatory association); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941) (action of trade association in boycotting retailers who stocked "pirated" designs per se
illegal). After reviewing the Court's decisions in Radiant Burners, Fashion Originators' Guild of
America and Silver, Professor Sullivan asserted that "absent a congressional enactment giving
antitrust exemption, no self-regulatory reason, however much it might be in the public interest,
would warrant a specific boycott." L. SULLIVAN, supra note 66, § 87, at 247. See also supra notes
71-98 and accompanying text.
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per se rule condemning group boycotts simply because the challenged
conduct was justified as self-regulatory.2 1 Thus, it is clear that the approach of the Third Circuit in Weiss is also at variance with the paramount interpreter of the Sherman Act-the United States Supreme
Court.
In summary, the approaches taken by the Seventh, Third and District of Columbia Courts of Appeals in diminishing the scope of the per
se rule condemning group boycotts, as a means for reaching rule-ofreason analysis, cannot find persuasive support in the relevant Supreme
Court precedents. However, these courts are justified in reasoning that
group boycotts by health care professionals often result in pro-competitive effects; namely, self-regulation by members of a profession to ensure that minimal levels of competence and professionalism are present
before granting a fellow practitioner a desired status or entitlement.
Nevertheless, the approach of these courts in adamantly attempting to
diminish the Supreme Court's group boycott precedent is not sound,
because in general, concerted refusals to deal have as their purpose the
elimination of legitimate competitors and are, therefore, anticompetitive and unworthy of prolonged judicial analysis.2" 2 Moreover, lower
federal courts should follow, rather than distinguish on tenuous
grounds, the Supreme Court's decisions construing the Sherman Act,
especially when faced with the well-entrenched and time-tested rule
condemning group boycotts. Instead of "fighting" the Supreme Court
on its group boycott position, lower federal courts should reach the
rule-of-reason for evaluating group boycotts by health care professionals through a different and distinct method of analysis that finds
stronger precedential support in the Court's decisions.
Specifically, the approach that should be utilized by the courts is
based solely on the Goldfarb footnote dichotomy, which remains undiminished as a source for providing differential antitrust treatment of
group boycotts by health care professionals.2' 3 For instance, in both the
National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE)and Maricopa decisions, the Supreme Court indicated a continued willingness to treat
professionals differently when the alleged restraint of trade was premised on "public service or ethical norms" justifications. The thrust of
the Court's infamous Goldfarb footnote 17 is best exemplified by the
Court's decision in NSPE.21 4 According to the language in the NSPE
decision, when members of a learned profession justify their challenged

211. See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 65-71.
213. For an analysis of the Goldfarb differential treatment dichotomy, see supra notes
30-64 and accompanying text.
214.
National Soc'y1985
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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conduct on competency considerations or other ethical norms peculiar
to the particular profession, the challenged restraint will be relieved
from immediate condemnation under the per se rule. Instead, the conduct at issue will be analyzed under the rule-of-reason for a determina1 5
tion of whether the practice promotes or suppresses competition. 1
The Supreme Court has placed certain limits on the breadth of
differential treatment offered by the Goldfarb footnote. Specifically,
the Court will not tolerate "manifestly anticompetitive conduct simply
because the health care industry is involved. ' 216 However, to date, the
Court has established only two categories of trade restraints that are so
anticompetitive that the Court has been unwilling to offer professionals
different antitrust treatment: price-fixing and certain tying arrangements. 1 7 The Court has not condemned group boycotts by health care
professionals as so "manifestly anticompetitive" that different antitrust
treatment is not available for such practitioners under the Goldfarb
footnote as developed in NSPE. Therefore, where the conduct in question is a group boycott by health care professionals, Supreme Court
decisions support an antitrust analysis based on the rule-of-reason when
the defendants premise their conduct on legitimate "public service or
ethical norms" justifications.
Lower federal courts have placed some reliance on the Goldfarb
footnote dichotomy. For example, the Third Circuit in Weiss recognized that this Supreme Court precedent, albeit dictum, can serve as
an " 'escape hatch' . . . [which] can extricate the defendants from the
'cut' of the per se rule.1118 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit in Wilk, after reviewing the Goldfarb footnote as developed in NSPE and Maricopa, noted that the Court had "taken pains" to preserve the possibility
of different antitrust treatment for the learned professions. 1 9 Accordingly, the Wilk court asserted that a justification for a group boycott of
chiropractors based on the medical profession's concern for the scientific method presented "questions of sufficient delicacy and novelty at
least to escape per se treatment."22
Although the lower federal courts have looked to the Goldfarb
footnote as a basis for reaching rule-of-reason analysis, these courts
have not placed primary reliance on the differential treatment dichotomy. Instead, the Third, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits
have primarily relied on diminishing the scope of the Supreme Court's

215. See id. at 696.
216. Jefferson Parish, 104 S. Ct. at 1565 n.42. See supra text accompanying note 60.
217. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
218. Weiss, 745 F.2d at 820.
219. Wilk, 719 F.2d at 222.
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group boycott precedents as a means for reaching the rule-of-reason for
evaluating group boycotts by health care professionals. 22 1 This diminution approach constitutes an avoidance and civil disobedience of the
Supreme Court's authority in defining the parameters of antitrust analysis under the Sherman Act. Moreover, because the Court has not disavowed its differential treatment dichotomy in the context of group
boycotts by health care professionals, this comment contends that the
lower federal courts should place sole reliance on the Goldfarb footnote
dichotomy as authority for reaching the rule-of-reason in analyzing this
type of professional conduct challenged under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.
The benefits of such a straightforward approach are twofold. First,
if lower courts consistently rely on the Supreme Court's indications
that different treatment of the learned professions is merited in certain
situations, it could force the Supreme Court to accept certiorari on this
issue to specifically delineate the permissible bounds of different treatment of professionals under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Such direct
clarification is needed from the Court because it has consistently let
this issue "burn" for ten years through various footnote pronouncements on its inclination to treat professionals differently. Certainty in
this area of contemporary antitrust law is imperative in order to provide the learned professions with the discretion and incentive to engage
in effective self-regulation. The second benefit of placing sole reliance
on the Goldfarb footnote dichotomy as a means for reaching the ruleof-reason is that it could very well encourage the Supreme Court to
clarify the proper variables that courts are to consider in a rule-of-reason analysis of professional group boycotts. Currently, the approaches
taken by the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits are at variance
with a traditional rule-of-reason analysis. In sum, the application of the
Sherman Act to group boycotts by health care professionals is an area
of antitrust law that is ripe for current Supreme Court attention.
B. The Correctness of the Rule-of-Reason Standards Utilized by the
Federal Courts of Appeals
In reaching the rule-of-reason to analyze the conduct of health
care professionals in boycotting members of their profession or other
health care practitioners, it it clear that the Seventh and District of
Columbia Circuits in Wilk and Kreuzer, respectively, did not utilize
the traditional rule-of-reason balancing approach. Instead, while relieving the defendants from the per se rule condemning group boycotts,

221.

For a discussion of the diminution approaches taken by the federal courts of appeals,
198-213.

see supra
text accompanying
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these courts still employed a heightened, intermediate standard of review which placed a heavy burden on the defendants, through use of a
least restrictive means requirement, to justify their exclusionary conduct. Thus, although the Wilk and Kreuzer courts intimated that they
were applying the rule-of-reason, the reality of their analyses demonstrates that they were not.
For example, the Seventh Circuit in Wilk articulated a rule-ofreason standard that initially placed the burden on the plaintiff to show
that the challenged conduct had an anticompetitive effect. However,
even after this burden was satisfied, the court then permitted the defendants to escape Sherman Act liability without a showing that the
AMA's group boycott of chiropractors had an overall pro-competitive
effect, because the defendants' initial burden only required a showing
of a dominant and specific patient care motive.222 In allowing "[a]
value independent of the values attributed to unrestrained competition"
to enter the rule-of-reason equation,2 2 the Wilk court departed from
the traditional and proper method of antitrust analysis. This is because
the Supreme Court has mandated that a rule-of-reason analysis must
focus "directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions. ' 2 24 By allowing defendants to escape antitrust liability by simply showing that the health care professionals' conduct was premised
on a genuine, reasonable, and dominant patient care motive,2 25 the Seventh Circuit's "rule-of-reason" approach does not place the requisite
emphasis on competitive effects. Under a proper rule-of-reason analysis, defendant health care professionals should be required to prove that
their conduct has an overall pro-competitive effect-such an effect cannot be presumed. For this reason, the Seventh Circuit's standard is defective because it does not have as its sole inquiry an analysis of
"whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or
one that suppresses competition."22 6
Additionally, it is clear that the Wilk court, while unjustifiably
relieving the defendants of the burden of specifically showing that their
conduct was pro-competitive, also imposed a troublesome requirement
on the defendants to prove that their "concern for scientific method in
patient care could not have been adequately satisfied in a manner less
restrictive of competition. 22 7 This "least restrictive" requirement is

222. See Wilk, 719 F.2d at 227. The Seventh Circuit's standard is reproduced in the footnotes. See supra note 195.
223. Wilk, 719 F.2d at 227.
224. NSPE, 435 U.S. at 688.
225. See supra note 195.
226. NSPE, 435 U.S. at 691.
227. Wilk, 719 F.2d at 227.
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simply divorced from a proper rule-of-reason inquiry of whether the
challenged conduct promotes or suppresses competition. If the defendants can establish that their conduct has an overall pro-competitive
effect in improving the quality and efficiency of patient care, the health
care professionals should not be required to go a step further and
demonstrate that the practice at issue is the least restrictive available.
It is asserted that if a court relieves the health care group boycott from
per se condemnation, the defendants should receive the full benefit of a
straightforward, traditional rule-of-reason analysis.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
also employed a least restrictive requirement in its "rule-of-reason" approach in Kreuzer.2 28 In arriving at this heightened rule-of-reason inquiry, both the Wilk and Kreuzer courts utilized Supreme Court statements that, in actuality, do not support such an approach. 2 9
Specifically, the courts relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,230 and also placed weight on Justice
2 1
In Silver, while the Court
Blackmun's concurring opinion in NSPE.
did assert that the Exchange could engage in self-regulation to the "extent necessary" in achieving the objectives of the Securities Exchange
Act, the Court did not mandate a least restrictive means analysis in
every rule-of-reason inquiry involving trade or professional associations.2 32 The Court's decision in Silver cannot be extended this far; Silver is a distinguishable case where the Court was faced with the narrow issue of reconciling the competing policies behind two federal
statutes. 33 Moreover, the reliance of the Wilk and Kreuzer courts on
Justice Blackmun's concurrence in NSPE as a basis for requiring a
least restrictive means analysis is also misplaced. Notwithstanding the
fact that Justice Blackmun's concurrence was not necessary for the result in NSPE,2 34 his statement that the "Society's rule [was] . ..
grossly overbroad" '2 35 does not even approach a Supreme Court mandate that a traditional rule-of-reason analysis must include consideration of whether the means used were the least restrictive of competition. To the contrary, as Justice Stevens' majority opinion in NSPE
reconfirmed, the only inquiry mandated under the rule-of-reason is one
of whether the challenged practice promotes or suppresses

228. Kreuzer, 735 F.2d at 1495. See supra text accompanying notes 179-80.
229. See Wilk, 719 F.2d at 227; Kreuzer, 735 F.2d at 1495.
230. 373 U.S. 341 (1963). See supra text accompanying notes 90-97.
231. 435 U.S. 679, 699 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See supra note 47.
232. Silver, 373 U.S. at 361.
233. See id. at 347.
234. See supra note 47.
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competition.2 3 6
Upon initial analysis, it is hard not to concede that the least restrictive means requirement utilized by the Wilk and Kreuzer courts
does have initial emotional appeal-it also likely served as a court rationalization for relieving the defendants from the steadfast rule condemning group boycotts as per se illegal. Such a requirement may result in competition among medical practitioners that is less restrained
when requirements for membership in desired associations are made as
unrestrictive as possible to achieve their intended purpose. Nevertheless, such a standard also imposes a nebulous and burdensome requirement on the defendant. professional association. Less restrictive means
can generally always be found to defeat an otherwise pro-competitive
2 37
membership requirement.
More importantly, the least restrictive means analysis is simply
not mandated by the traditional rule-of-reason. If courts are going to
relieve defendant health care professionals from the per se rule against
group boycotts, they ought not employ a heightened standard that finds
no direct support in Supreme Court precedents. Defendants will already have an incentive to make membership requirements less restrictive in order to enhance the likelihood that their practice will be found
pro-competitive. When the Goldfarb footnote dichotomy is utilized to
relieve health care professionals from the per se rule against group boycotts, courts should not complicate analysis by articulating a specialized "rule-of-reason" standard just for professionals; rather, defendants
should be given the full benefit of a traditional rule-of-reason analysis.
Accordingly, if the conduct in question has an overall pro-competitive
effect, the defendant health care professionals should escape Sherman
Act liability.
The approach of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit provides support for such a method of analysis. In Weiss, while the court
did condemn the defendant medical staff's conduct as per se illegal, it
also provided important guidance for a rule-of-reason analysis of the
group boycott activity of health care professionals. Specifically, the
court's guidance offers a method for analyzing the defendant's "public

236. Id. at 691 (Stevens, J.). In performing the rule-of-reason analysis, a court could, of
course, consider how restrictive a particular practice was in arriving at the ultimate conclusion of
whether the restraint has an overall anticompetitive or pro-competitive effect. The problem with
the Wilk and Kreuzer approaches, however, is that these courts make the nebulous least restrictive
means analysis a separate inquiry apart from the rule-of-reason analysis. Thus, even if the professional concerted refusal to deal was found to have an overall pro-competitive effect, the practice
could still, unjustifiably, be declared illegal if the restraint was not the least restrictive available to
meet the particular health care professionals' "public service or ethical norms" objective.
237. See, e.g., Kreuzer, 735 F.2d at 1495 (court observed that a number of plausible least
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
restrictive alternatives existed to achieve the professional association's objectives).
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service and ethical norms" justifications under the traditional rule-ofreason inquiry of whether the challenged restraint promotes or suppresses competition.2 38 In the court's view, a medical staff's denial of
hospital admitting privileges to a physician based on competency considerations is pro-competitive and permissible under the rule-of-reason
because it enhances the quality of medical care.23 9 Likewise, the denial
of admitting privileges because of a physician's unprofessional conduct
is also pro-competitive and passes muster under the rule-of-reason because it increases the efficiency of a hospital's provision of medical services.2 40 In sum, the Third Circuit's method of analysis demonstrates
that group boycotts by health care professionals can be analyzed under
a traditional rule-of-reason equation to determine whether the questioned conduct promotes or suppresses competition.
In order to utilize such a straightforward rule-of-reason approach,
courts will simply have to engage in traditional economic analysis to
determine whether the health care professionals' proffered ethical norm
justifications serve competition-enhancing functions. Courts must be
willing to analyze whether health care professionals' utilization of competency and professional conduct standards in policing members of
their profession have overall pro-competitive effects; at the same time,
courts should avoid use of a nebulous least restrictive means requirement. It is recognized, however, that such "public service or ethical
norms" justifications can serve as pretextual shields for anticompetitive
conduct.2 4 1 Therefore, in order for a traditional rule-of-reason inquiry
to be a workable one, it will be necessary to develop a framework for
assessing legitimate "public service or ethical norms" justifications
from those which are merely pretextual rationales designed to further
the self-interests of the particular health care professionals.
C. A Proposed Rule-of-Reason Standardfor EvaluatingGroup Boycotts by Health Care Professionals
In order for the courts to effectively utilize the rule-of-reason balancing approach in analyzing group boycotts by health care professionals, criteria must be formulated to provide courts with a legitimate basis, consistent with the Goldfarb differential treatment dichotomy, for
avoiding the per se rule condemning concerted refusals to deal. This
comment therefore proposes a step-by-step analysis aimed at distinguishing legitimate professional self-regulation based upon "public ser-

238. See Weiss, 745 F.2d at 820 n.60.
239. Id. at 821 n.60.
240. Id.
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vice or ethical norms" rationales from concerted professional conduct
that is predominantly economically self-interested. This "characterization" process will require the court to determine whether the health
care professionals have advanced a bona fide "public service or ethical
norms" rationale for the challenged group boycott. If this first step of
the analysis is established, the court will then proceed to the second
step of the analysis which consists of a traditional rule-of-reason inquiry. In analyzing the challenged conduct under this second step, the
court should only be concerned with whether the overall effect of the
questioned restraint is to promote or suppress competition.
The first step of the proposed analysis of group boycotts by health
care professionals consists of a two-prong approach. The court must
first determine whether the defendants' challenged conduct deserves to
be relieved from the per se rule condemning group boycotts. Conduct
deserving of such relief is that premised on "public service or ethical
norms" justifications which are shown to be the motivating factor for
the concerted refusal to deal; thus, the court will be required to determine whether the defendants' concern for the competency and professional conduct of a fellow professional or other practitioner is bona fide.
In this "characterization" process, the court should analyze the events
leading up to the particular practice in question. Specifically, the court
should inquire into whether, for example, the particular health care
professionals have demonstrated a need for a membership requirement
focusing on the competency of a fellow practitioner, and the court
should analyze the procedures utilized in enforcing the membership restriction. The touchstone conclusion to be reached by the court is
whether the challenged restraint is predominantly in the economic selfinterest of the members of a professional association, or whether there
is stronger evidence of a need for a membership rule designed to ensure
professional competence and to improve the quality of patient care.2 42
If the court is satisfied that the defendants have shown that their
conduct was premised on a bona fide "public service or ethical norms"
justification, the court should proceed to the second prong of the first

242. In determining whether the adoption of membership restrictions is predominantly in
the self-interest of the professionals, the D.C. Circuit in Kreuzer provided a helpful standard. See
supra note 178. A court should determine whether more evidence exists showing a profit motive
underlying the group boycott or whether there is more persuasive evidence demonstrating that the
practice in question was truly designed and implemented to achieve the "public service or ethical
norms" objective of the health care professionals. See generally supra note 28. In making this
determination, evidence that the health care professionals utilized impartial review procedures and
other due process type mechanisms before excluding a practitioner should be persuasive. See
Weiss, 745 F.2d at 796-97 (applications for hospital admitting privileges passed through four
committees before final resolution and "judicial review" was available for negative
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
determinations).
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step of analysis. Under the second prong, the defendants should be required to make a preliminary showing that the membership restriction
in question could have pro-competitive effects. This showing is necessary because the court should not allow relief from the per se rule if
the practice in question is "manifestly anticompetitive." Once the court
is satisfied that the "boycott" was premised on a bona fide "public service or ethical norms" justification, and that the membership restriction
could have pro-competitive effects, the court should, utilizing the Goldfarb footnote dichotomy as its precedential basis,24 3 allow the defendants relief from the per se rule condemning group boycotts. Upon allowing the defendants' practice relief from immediate condemnation,
the court should then proceed to the second step of analysis which consists of a full rule-of-reason inquiry.
Simply because the court reaches rule-of-reason analysis should
not guarantee that the questioned conduct of the health care professionals will automatically pass muster under section I of the Sherman
Act. Rather, once the excluded plaintiff practitioner has demonstrated
the anticompetitive effect of the membership restriction, the defendants
will carry the heavy burden of establishing that the challenged group
boycott has an overall pro-competitive effect-that is, the practice promotes rather than suppresses competition. Specifically, the defendants
will have to prove, for example, that the denial of hospital admitting
privileges based on the lack of a minimum level of professional competence is pro-competitive in effect because it increases the quality of
medical care to the ultimate benefit of consumer-patients. Likewise, a
health care professional association that utilizes a "limited practice requirement" will have to prove that the effect of such a membership
restriction is pro-competitive in that it increases the expertise of the
particular professionals, thereby improving the quality of patient care
rather than increasing the pecuniary gains of member professionals. In
summary, in applying the second step of analysis, the court should utilize the traditional rule-of-reason balancing approach. The evidence
presented by the respective parties will enable the court, along with its
own economic analysis of the practice in question, to make a determination of whether the group boycott by health care professionals has an
overall pro-competitive effect.
In making this determination, the court should not employ a least
restrictive means analysis in addition to the balancing approach under
the rule-of-reason. The need for such a court inquiry will be eliminated
if the focus of analysis is solely on competitive considerations. This is
because, under the standard proposed by this comment, defendant
Published
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health care professionals will have the incentive to adopt narrow membership or admitting privilege requirements that focus solely on competency, professionalism, and quality of patient care considerations. Specifically, if unduly broad and burdensome membership requirements
are employed by the defendants, it will become apparent that the economic self-interest of the health care professionals predominates the
questioned practice, and even if the practice passes the first step of the
analysis, the court will likely find under the second step that the concerted refusal to deal has an overall anticompetitive effect.
Court utilization of a least restrictive means analysis demonstrates
reluctance on the court's part to fully relieve the defendants from the
onerous per se rule. Such a heightened, intermediate standard unduly
complicates antitrust analysis because health care professionals will always be faced, in retrospect, with innovative arguments that less restrictive membership requirements are available. If courts focus solely
on the suppress-promote competition equation, defendant health care
professionals will be encouraged to adopt narrow competency and professionalism criteria focusing on the quality and enhancement of patient care, as these are the only membership or admitting privilege restrictions that will have an overall pro-competitive effect.
Other commentators have also supported the adoption of standards
for analysis of the challenged conduct of health care professionals by
methods other than immediate condemnation under the per se rule
against group boycotts.244 One commentator, for example, proposes a
two-step analysis which has as its initial focus a determination of
whether the challenged professional conduct has a commercial versus
noncommercial self-regulatory purpose. 46 Under this approach, if the
challenged restraint is found not to have a predominant profit-oriented
or commercial purpose, the court should proceed to rule-of-reason analysis. This approach is similar to that proposed by this comment but
with one very important qualification. Specifically, the second prong of
the first step of analysis proposed by this comment contains the requirement that the defendant make a preliminary showing that the
questioned practice could have pro-competitive effects. The court must

244. See, e.g., Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges.
Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CAL. L. REV. 595 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Kissam &
Holzgraefe]; Leibenluft & Pollard, Antitrust Scrutiny of the Health Professions: Developing a
Framework for Assessing Private Restraints, 34 VAND. L. REV. 927 (1981); Note, The Professions and Noncommercial Purposes: Applicability of Per Se Rules Under the Sherman Act, 11 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 387 (1978). See generally Brunet, Streamlining Antitrust Litigation by "Facial
Examination" of Restraints: The Burger Court and the Per Se - Rule of Reason Distinction,60
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1984) (advocating a "quick look" at restraints of trade before either the per se
or the rule-of-reason methods of analysis are applied).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/5
245. Note, supra note 244, at 399-400.
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not focus solely on whether the conduct in question has a predominant
noncommercial purpose, but must also consider likely competitive effects, because the Supreme Court has c6nsistently mandated an inquiry
"confined to a consideration of impact on competitive conditions." 24 6
The defendant, therefore, must be required to advance a credible argument that the questioned practice likely has a pro-competitive effect
before the court can relieve the challenged restraint from per se condemnation and proceed to a full rule-of-reason analysis.
Other commentators argue, in the context of the denial of hospital
admitting privileges, that the courts should simply rely in totality, "for
proof of an antitrust violation, that there be convincing evidence that
the privilege decision has been motivated by a dominant anticompetitive purpose. 2 4 7 Although these commentators concede that "antitrust
in general does not require proof of an evil purpose, but [employs] such
evidence to help interpret and predict effects," 248 the reliance of this
approach solely on a "dominant anticompetitive purpose" for proof of a
Sherman Act violation is directly at odds with Supreme Court precedent. It cannot be denied that any inquiry under the rule-of-reason
must focus on anticompetitive effects. The Supreme Court has simply
not shown any inclination to shift rule-of-reason analysis, or for that
matter, per se analysis, to an inquiry solely focusing on the purpose of
the restraint. To the contrary, even if the challenged restraint is shown
to have a pro-competitive purpose, to escape Sherman Act liability, it
must also be demonstrated that the restraint has an overall pro-compet249
itive effect.
Finally, the approach taken by two other commentators deserves
careful attention because it focuses on the touchstone Supreme Court
mandate under a rule-of-reason inquiry-the effect on competition.2 50
These commentators advance a rebuttable presumption approach-when
the conduct of health care professionals, which would in other contexts
be considered per se illegal, is challenged under the Sherman Act.2 51
This approach begins with the presumption that the challenged conduct
of health care professionals is unlawful; however, this presumption can
be rebutted through the defendants' showing of a "plausible procompetitive rationale as well as evidence of good faith, the absence of less
246. NSPE, 435 U.S. at 690. See also Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women
v. NCAA, 735 F.2d 577, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("A party's intent is relevant only insofar as it
helps predict the probable competitive impact of a disputed practice.") (citing Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
247. Kissam & Holzgraefe, supra note 244, at 670.
248. Id.
249. See NSPE, 435 U.S. at 696 n.22.
250. Leibenluft & Pollard, supra note 244, at 951.
251.
Id. at 951-52. 1985
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restrictive alternatives, and perhaps insubstantial market power. ' ' 51
The criticism of this approach is that it would allow the defendants to
utilize this rebuttable presumption even with classic per se violations
such as price-fixing. 53 Today, however, there is no question but that
the Supreme Court will not tolerate price-fixing by any learned profession.215 4 Additionally, the Court has foreclosed the possibility of different antitrust treatment for health care professionals when the conduct
2 55
at issue is "manifestly anticompetitive.
The rebuttable presumption approach, although enlightening, can
also be critized for failing to give proper deference to the differential
treatment dichotomy offered by the Goldfarb footnote as interpreted in
2 56
NSPE, Maricopa, and Jefferson Parish.
Specifically, this approach
imposes a very heavy burden on defendant health care professionals
before a court can even reach a full rule-of-reason analysis. The requirement that defendants show that the means chosen are the least
restrictive available is a burden that may be impossible for health care
professionals to ever overcome. Moreover, the Goldfarb footnote, as interpreted, offers the court a method for reaching a full rule-of-reason
inquiry without a preliminary, intermediate analysis of the defendants'
conduct when the health care professionals present bona fide "public
service or ethical norms" justifications.
In summary, the approach proposed by this comment for analyzing group boycotts by health care professionals consists of a two-step
process that finds as its basis the Goldfarb differential treatment dichotomy and a rule-of-reason analysis consistent with Supreme Court
precedents. The first step of proposed analysis requires the court to determine whether the defendants have shown that the challenged conduct was premised on bona fide "public service or ethical norms" justifications, and requires a court determination of whether the defendants
have advanced a credible preliminary argument that the challenged
conduct could have pro-competitive effects. If the court is satisfied that
the health care professionals have met their burden under both prongs
of the first step of analysis, the defendants should be relieved from the
per se rule condemning group boycotts. Under the second step of this
proposed approach, the court should utilize a full rule-of-reason analysis to determine whether the defendants have violated section 1 of the

252. Id. at 955.
253. See id.
254. See Jefferson Parish, 104 S. Ct. at 1565 n.42. See also supra note 63.
255. As Justice Stevens noted, "we have refused to tolerate manifestly anticompetitive conduct simply because the health care industry is involved." Jefferson Parish, 104 S. Ct. at 1565
n.42.
256. See supra notes 30-64 & 213-17 and accompanying text.
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Sherman Act. The court's focus under the rule-of-reason will, of
course, be directed toward determining the competitive impact of the
challenged group boycott; the practice should escape Sherman Act liability if it has an overall pro-competitive effect. This two-step method
of analysis is a workable one for courts faced with the difficult question
of group boycotts by health care professionals. This standard is not
only consistent with traditional "competitive effects" antitrust analysis,
but it also allows a court to consider legitimate, bona fide "public service or ethical norms" justifications in this contemporary and controversial area of antitrust law.
D. The Rule-of-Reason Is the Appropriate Standardfor Analyzing
Group Boycotts by Health Care Professionals.
Currently there is a substantial need for allowing health care professionals to engage in self-regulation to ensure that fellow practitioners
have, at least, minimal levels of competence and professionalism. Exemplifying this need for self-regulation is a recent statistical estimation
that five to fifteen percent of the physicians practicing medicine in the
United States are incompetent.157 This report concludes that the cause
of such a high number of incompetent physicians is the failure of the
medical profession to crack down on itself by actively policing its members. 258 Moreover, considering the growing medical malpractice crisis
in the United States, the failure of medical societies to actively police
their members undoubtedly contributes to the problem of incompetency
and resulting medical errors. 59 The logical economic effect of an increasing number of malpractice cases is that practitioners' insurance
premiums rise, thereby increasing entry barriers in the particular
health care field, which will ultimately lead to higher health care
costs.2 60 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the failure of the medi-

257. See Feinstein, The Ethics of Professional Regulation, NEw ENG. J. MED., Mar. 21,
1985, at 802.
258. See id. at 802-04. See generally Dolan, The Law and the Maverick Health Practitioner, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 627 (1982) (analysis of the shortcomings of the current system of selfregulation).
259. See Relman, Professional Regulation and the State Medical Boards, NEw ENG. J.
MED., Mar. 21, 1985, at 784-85. In commenting on the shortcomings of the state medical regulatory boards, Dr. Relman asserts: "All the evidence suggests, therefore, that most if not all the
states have been too lax-not too strict-in their enforcement of medical professional standards."
Id. at 785. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the growing number of malpractice cases cannot be totally attributable to the lack of effective self-regulation in the medical profession. Indeed,
certain members of the legal profession are seen as adamantly fostering "frivilous" litigation in
numerous malpractice cases, perhaps encouraged by the unrealistic expectations of disgruntled
consumer-patients.
260. The rise in medical malpractice insurance premiums and thus health care costs is also
a function
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cal profession to actively engage in self-regulation results in anticompetitive consequences.
In the face of such problems in the health care profession, it is
unwise socially, as well as economically, to frustrate the efforts of hospital medical staffs and professional associations in policing their fellow
practitioners to ensure that standards of minimal competence are met
before granting an individual desired professional status. However, an
antitrust approach that condemns such professional "watchdog" activities as per se illegal group boycotts has such a frustrating effect. When
faced with treble damage liability for Sherman Act violations, health
care professionals are simply going to avoid such socially beneficial
self-regulation and engage in a conspiracy of silence.
Because a health care professional association is probably the
"group best suited to judge the competence of its members to hold
themselves out to the public as specialists," 26' 1 the courts ought to cautiously defer to the decision of a professional association, or a medical
staff, to exclude a practitioner. The position of this comment is that the
courts can provide such deference while concurrently ensuring that the
policy of competition mandated by the Sherman Act is preserved. By
utilizing a rule-of-reason approach in accordance with the proposal outlined in division C above, courts will not provide a disincentive for professional self-regulation. Moreover, courts will still have ample opportunity to distinguish "manifestly anticompetitive" group boycotts from
those concerted refusals to deal by health care professionals that are
based on bona fide competency considerations designed to improve the
quality of patient care. Although such a rule-of-reason inquiry may entail "significant costs" in terms of "litigation efficiency," 26 2 the social
costs of frustrating legitimate self-regulation by health care professionals outweigh the potential loss in judicial economy. Today, it is "unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with
other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions
antitrust concepts which originated in other areas." '63
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Goldfarb differential treatment dichotomy has finally found
its place in contemporary antitrust analysis. In the context of group
boycotts by health care professionals, different antitrust treatment is
advisable because of the legitimate "public service or ethical norms"

practice "'Crisis",TRIAL, May, 1985, at 24.
261. Kreuzer, 735 F.2d at 1491 (citing Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States at 5-6).
262. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982).
263. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975).
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justifications upon which this brand of exclusionary conduct is often
premised. However, in concluding that the per se rule condemning
group boycotts should not be religiously applied to this type of professional activity, this comment does not advocate wholesale abandonment
of traditional antitrust analysis. Rather, this comment asserts that
there is a principled basis under Supreme Court precedent to analyze
concerted refusals to deal by health care professionals under the ruleof-reason. In three recent decisions, federal courts of appeals appear to
have taken such an approach. Nevertheless, upon closer scrutiny, it is
clear that these courts have in reality utilized an intermediate standard
of antitrust review lying somewhere between the per se and the rule-ofreason approaches.
The utilization of such an intermediate standard of analysis does
not give proper deference to the interests of health care professionals in
regulating the competency of their fellow practitioners. The approach
that should be taken by courts is an initial inquiry to determine the
genuineness and potential competitive effects of the defendants' challenged conduct premised on "public service or ethical norms" justifications, followed by a full-scale rule-of-reason analysis to determine
whether the questioned restraint has an overall pro-competitive effect.
This approach will encourage rather than stifle legitimate self-regulation by health care professionals while still promoting the aims of the
Sherman Act in preserving unrestrained competition on the merits.
Daniel P. Utt
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